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 1. Introduction 
 
Jakarta’s water supply system is highly fragmented. As documented in this report, the 
formal water supply system reaches less than 50% of the city’s inhabitants, and is spatially 
concentrated in higher income areas of the city. The majority of Jakarta’s residents make use of a 
variety of different water sources– bottled water, vendor water, shallow and deep wells, public 
hydrants, network connections – to meet their daily water needs (Bakker 2003b), often relying 
exclusively on water abstracted and delivered outside of the network (Bakker forthcoming, Surjadi 
et al 1994, McGranahan et al 2001). Indeed, a significant proportion of households with connections 
to the networked water supply system continue to rely primarily upon other sources of water supply 
given low water quality and intermittent network pressure, and non-networked (or so-called 
‘informal’) water services thrive in areas where networked connections are available (Susantono, 
Bakker). Documenting and explaining the reasons for this spatial and social differentiation of 
access, and using this information to intervene in current debates about pro-poor water supply 
management, are the two primary goals of this report. 
 
Unequal access to water supply and sanitation has been characterized as one of the key 
development challenges for the South in the next century. Halving by 2015 the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation is one of the Millennium 
Development Goals established by the international community at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg. Because of positive externalities related to water-related 
infrastructure provision, achieving the water and sanitation goal will also contribute to other 
Millenium Development Goals, such as those related to child health (Fay et al 2005). The World 
Health Organisation estimates that 1.1 billion people worldwide do not have access to safe drinking 
water, and 2.4 billion are without access to adequate sanitation (WHO, 2004). An increasing 
proportion of users without access to adequate water supplies live in urban areas; despite residing 
in a metropolitan area, poor families in large cities in the South frequently do not have networked 
water supply access.   
 
The urban water supply problem presents a particularly acute challenge to the development 
community, given its persistence despite sustained and significant investment by bilateral aid 
agencies and multilateral financial organizations. Supplying water to the world’s poor has been high 
on the agenda of the international community for decades. Water supply figured prominently on the 
agendas of the Stockholm Environment (1972) and Vancouver Habitat
 (1976) conferences. At the 
UN’s Mar del Plata conference (1977), the United Nations Water and Sanitation Decade was 
formally agreed; over the period 1981-90, bilateral aid and multilateral finance was directed 
towards water supply projects in the South in unprecedented amounts (WHO 1992). At the end of 
the decade, more people (in absolute terms) were being supplied with ‘improved water supplies’ than 
ever before; during the decade, it was estimated that 1.2 billion people were provided with a safe 
and adequate water supply (WHO 1992). Yet, in many countries, the increase in supply had failed to 
keep pace with population growth, and growing numbers of people remained without access to the 
World Health Organization minimum of 50 L per person per day of potable water; the number 
unserved by a safe and adequate water supply fell by only 450 million during the same period (WHO 
1992). This failure is part of the reason for the emergence of a wide-ranging debate on new 
approaches to water supply in the South which emerged in the 1990s, characterized by 
controversial and contested calls for greater private and reduced public sector involvement in water supply management; treatment of water as an economic rather than public good; full-cost 
recovery pricing rather than subsidisation; alternative pro-poor infrastructure (such as condominial 
rather than in-house connections); and a ‘new water paradigm’ focused on demand management 
rather than the conventional supply-side focus (Gleick 2000a; Bakker 2004).  
 
Analyzing Jakarta’s water supply system in light of these debates and in relation to broader human 
development concerns, this paper begins from a different starting point than much of the current 
debate on water supply and the poor. We demonstrates in Sections 2 and 3 that, in the case of 
Jakarta, both the public and private sectors have failed to supply sufficient amounts of safe water 
to the poor
1.  This finding lends support to Budds and McGranahan’s argument (2003) that the 
public-private debates in water supply are ‘missing the point’ (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). Many 
of the flaws which underlie failed water supply systems are in attributable not to private sector or 
governments, but are rather attributable to conventional governance structures associated with 
large-scale capital-intensive network water supply technologies, together with specific economic 
approaches to tariffs and financing. The result, in Jakarta, has been a water supply system which 
has been spatially segregated and socially differentiated since its inception, serving middle and 
upper-class households in specific residential areas, the business district, and key industrial zones, 
while excluding lower-income households in the majority of the city.  
  
 
Attempts to ameliorate this situation have been, to date, of limited success. As explored in detail in 
Section 4 through a case study of private and public sector pro-poor water supply programs 
undertaken in 2005 in Jakarta, ‘pro poor’ approaches to water supply adopted by both the public and 
private sectors have consistently misrepresented the reasons why poor customers are both 
prevented from, and have chosen not to connect to the network. This discussion relates to broader 
reforms in Indonesia’s water sector. As explored in Section 5, Indonesia is currently undergoing 
dramatic and politically contentious reforms to the entire water sector. Indonesians are actively 
debating the degree to which these reforms are likely to solve – or exacerbate -- the problem of 
water supply for the urban poor. Much of this debate is highly polarized around support for (or 
vilification of) conventional public and private-sector solutions. Yet the findings of this report, as 
discussed in the concluding section of the paper, point to alternative governance, infrastructural, 
pricing and financing models which transcend this public-private binary. Accordingly, the report 
closes with some suggestions for where future research might fruitfully focus on the question of 
water supply for the urban poor in the global South. 
 
                                                 
1 This analysis is based on research carried out over the period of three years in Jakarta. An initial visit was conducted in 
2001; followed by initial archival work in the colonial archives in the Netherlands in 2003. Subsequent research took place 
over an 18 month period from 2004 to 2005. Data was obtained from: (1) a household survey of poor households in six 
Jakarta ‘kampungs’ (neighbourhoods) in 2005; (2) public and internal reports from the two private concessionaires, the 
Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body, and the Jakarta municipal government; (3) interviews with water supply managers, 
government officials, international financial institutions, aid agencies, and NGO representatives in 2001, 2004 and 2005; (4)  
a survey of the KITLV (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde/Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast 
Asian and Caribbean Studies)  and KIT (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen/Royal Tropical Institute) archives 2003 in 
Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 2.  A ‘public’ utility? The history of Jakarta’s water supply system 
 
Water infrastructure networks have one of the longest turnover times of any dedicated 
utility infrastructure; in many cities in both developed and developing countries, it is common to 
find pipes over 100 years old still in service. Given this longevity, water networks physically embody 
successive phases of management and investment. Networks of mains, tertiary pipes, pumps, 
reservoirs, and sewers are artefacts of past decisions, shaped by successive generations of social, 
technical, and economic practices. Understanding historical choices about water supply networks is 
thus necessary for an understanding of contemporary water supply networks. In this section of the 
report, the history of Jakarta’s water supply system is summarized. A key finding of the analysis is 
that Jakarta’s water supply system has been highly fragmented since its inception, and access to 
water supply has consequently been strongly differentiated socially (restricting access to certain 
types of users) and spatially (through confining access to specific neighbourhoods and water uses). 
This pattern of differentiation and exclusion was initiated by colonial administrators, and 
entrenched through urban planning and water supply management practices instituted in the post-
colonial period. This analysis contradicts conventional theories of water supply networks (based on 
studies of large cities in OECD countries) in which a ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ of universal 
provision was applied to network utility services throughout much of the 20
th century, and in which 
access is typically more homogenous (Graham and Marvin 2001). Cities in the South have often 
followed a very different trajectory; this has implications for the debate about strategies for 
meeting human development needs for water supply in Jakarta, and in the global South more 
generally. 
 
2a Hygienic ‘Normalization’: The development of Batavia’s water supply system (1873 – 1949) 
 
Jakarta’s first water supply system consisted of a series of artesian wells, supplying the 
European urban population with a water supply through architecturally elaborate communal 
hydrants. From 1873–1876 seven publicly funded wells were drilled (Maronier, 1929). Initial 
production capacity was later expanded, so that by 1920, there were 28 wells and 12 reservoirs 
with a capacity of 750 m
3 available for ‘public’ (i.e. European) use (Maronier, 1929). These wells were 
strategically sited in a new neighbourhood (Weltevreden, contemporary site of the Monas 
Monument and public square) two miles to the south of the old city, located upon higher ground, 
which Dutch colonials had established in an attempt to escape the regular epidemics which had 
fostered Batavia’s reputation as ‘Graveyard of the East’ (Abeyasekere, 1987. 1989; Maronier 1929). 
Relying on racialized discourses, contemporary observers contrasted the  ‘hygienic’ and ‘modern’ use 
of groundwater by the Dutch ‘colonial’ population to the practice of surface water use by native 
‘kampong’ residents in old Batavia, who were ‘lacking in modernity’ and unwilling to pay for artesian 
water supplies (which had to be aerated and cooled before being consumed) (Van Breen, 1916; Van 
Leeuwen, 1920) (ironically inverted in the 20
th century, as poor residents often rely on shallow wells, 
whereas surface water sources originating upstream of Jakarta feed the water supply network, 
which is largely accessed by wealthier households in the city).  
This strategy of restricting formal water supply provision to Batavia’s colonial population 
was increasingly questioned in the 20
th century, as increasing awareness grew of new scientific 
concepts linking water supply and human health, in which a bacteriological conception of disease 
replaced earlier theories of ‘miasmas’ (Gandy 1997, Goubert 1986). In the Netherlands East Indies, 
this new approach was disseminated through the results of water quality tests conducted by military doctors (Moens 1873), as part of a broader (and unprecedented) set of government 
initiatives to improve public health through the provision of infrastructure (Argo 1999, Mrazek 
2002),  Acting on a desire to increase water consumption for reasons of public health, water 
supplies, usually drawn from surface water, were gradually extended into ‘kampongs’ through public 
standpipes (‘hydrants’) (Eggink 1930).  
 
A new water supply system reliant on mountain spring water, delivered via iron pipes 53 
kilometres in length, was in preparation for the first two decades of the 20
th century. Finally 
operational in 1923
2, the spring water network served the Municipality of Batavia, the municipality 
of Meester Cornelis (incorporated into Batavia in 1935), and the harbour at Tanjung Priok. Water 
production capacity increased to over 350 l/s, reservoir size grew from 780 m3 to 20 000 m3, the 
city network was extended by over 150 kilometres, and best of all – the water from the pipes could 
be used ‘straight out of the tap’ without need for purification, or cooling, as was the case for 
artesian water (Smitt, 1922). The planned provision of 90% of European households with a supply of 
140 L/capita/day enabled a new kind of life, “imparting to the Batavia house a more European 
character”...as “most bathrooms have nowadays a shower from which the fresh water from the tap 
may be showered over the body” (Gemeente Batavia, 1937:70). Based upon scientific knowledge, 
demonstrating technological mastery, and facilitating a ‘modern’ urban lifestyle, the source water 
network symbolized the emergence of a new kind of colonial government, city, and urban citizen: 
ethical, modern, and hygienic.  
 
The project of modernizing (or, in colonial language, ‘normalizing’) the native population justified 
subsequent interventions of the colonial government into water supply, sanitation, housing, and 
hygiene in the ‘problematic’ urban spaces (Van Breen, 1919).  Of central concern was continued use 
of the city’s kalis (canals) for bathing and of ‘suspect’ groundwater sources for drinking (Gomperts, 
1916, Van Raay, 1915). Accordingly, previous plans for the spring water network – that had intended 
to supply only European neighbourhoods -- were revised, and a new plan was initiated in the 1920s in 
order to extend water supply into the kampongs (Van Leeuwen, 1917). The system was based on a 
dual design standard:  140 L/day to be distributed to 90% of the European households in Batavia, in 
contrast to an anticipated delivery of only 65 L/capita/day to only 33% of the native population (van 
Breen, 1916)
3. The majority of the ‘served’ native population was supplied by public hydrants and 
water vendors, which was initially viewed as a temporary measure. However, the transition into 
house connections within the kampongs was never achieved on a large scale, in part because of 
racialized assumptions about different water needs, and also because of concerns over the low 
potential for cost recovery in the kampungs. Charges for water supply in kampong areas were 
introduced in 1926, after which water use in the kampong areas actually decreased (Maronier 1929), 
with some kampongs actively resisting the introduction of ‘modern’ water (as with other modern 
amenities) (Argo, 1999; Karsten 1958), and ‘tampering’ with meters and water ‘theft’ being reported 
by colonial administrators (Maronier 1929). Accordingly, the penetration of the water supply 
network into the non-European neighbourhoods remained limited. The result was a differentiation 
                                                 
2 The Ciburial springs in Bogor, with a reported capacity of 600 L/s by the end of the colonial period, but supply decreased 
by the 1980s to around 400 l/s. (PAM Jaya 1992). 
3 The capacity of the newly enhanced water supply system could theoretically have satisfied Jakarta’s entire population (of 
approximately 800,000) up until the end of the 1940s, after which population growth was rapid, assuming a per capita water 
demand of 50/person/day respectively and reasonable (e.g. 30%) distribution losses. of access and consumption levels: in 1929, the European population, comprising only 7% of the 
population, consumed 78% of the volume of water supplied to residential customers (Eggink, 1930)
4.  
 
2b Hydraulic Modernity: Water supply as ‘modernist monument’ (1949 – 1965) 
 
The pattern of differentiated water supply established during the colonial period was 
further entrenched following Independence in 1949. Following damage to the colonial water 
infrastructure during the war, the existing system was incapable of meeting water demands from 
the rapidly growing population of Jakarta, and so in 1952, plans for the construction of the city’s 
first large-scale water treatment plants (Pejompongan I&II) were drawn up. By 1957, Pejompongan 
I was operational, adding 2000 l/s of treated river water to the network; Pejompongan II 
(completed in the mid-1960s) later added another 1000 l/s (PAM Jaya, 1992a). These treatment 
plants were a political, as well as technical project, reflective of a desire to modernize Jakarta on 
the part of Indonesia’s elite: surface waters, rather than groundwater, were to be resuscitated 
through intensive Western water treatment technologies, as an example of the transformation of 
colonial Batavia into independent Jakarta
5.  
 
In the decades following Independence, water supply in Jakarta continued to be highly 
differentiated, and was characterized by many similarities to colonial patterns of water provision. 
In part, this was because of technological constraints: the new surface water supply continued to 
be distributed through the colonial piped network, and was thereby restricted to more affluent 
areas of the city. But this is only a partial explanation, as investments were made in the first 
decade following Independence to both rehabilitate and expand the water supply network. This 
expansion was largely limited, however, to upper class residential areas and the highrise 
developments springing up underneath the guidance of President ‘architect’ Sukarno. Most kampong 
residents were consistently excluded from network access, remaining reliant upon open wells and 
surface waters (Argo, 1999).   
 
Why did the government adopt this strategy? Production of a new source of water to increase the 
volume of supply could have enabled the newly independent government to serve its newly 
emancipated citizens, at a time when the government began to ‘reclaim’ key industries and land from 
colonial owners (see Robison, 1986). However, rather than pursuing a welfare agenda, the 
government focused on broader political economic agendas. Most importantly, government 
management of water supply focused on its symbolic significance in urban and national governance. 
Remaking Jakarta as an ‘international’ city symbolized by ‘modern monuments’ was a central part of 
President Sukarno’s vision for post-independence Indonesia (Kusno 1997, Leclerc 1993; van der 
Kroef 1954, as cited in Kusno, 2000). The first postcolonial investments into the city’s urban water 
supply reflected the rationality of the associated ‘city beautiful movement’ whereby national 
greatness would be expressed through the physical transformation and modernization of Jakarta 
(Geertz, 1963; MacDonald, 1995). This ‘monumentalist’ infrastructure served a dual purpose of 
                                                 
4 In 1929, 6 926 kampung households were supplied with 24L/s, while 10 392 European households were supplied with 84 L/s. 
The European population in Batavia in 1930 was 37 067, while the native Indonesian population was over 400 000 (Eggink, 
1930). 
5 The spring water source did continue to contribute a small portion of the city’s water supply up until 1994. In 1957, after 
the completion of Pejompongan I, the colonial spring water supply would have provided between 15-30% of the total 
production capacity (see PAM Jaya, 1992a for details on water production capacity over the years).   urban development and source of pride for the new nation, whereas urban services provision and the 
urban environment were given relatively low priority (Chifos and Hendropranoto 2000; Firman and 
Dharmapatni 1994; Ford 1993; Kusno 1997; World Bank 2004b), despite sporadic national 
government-led development plans to accelerate service delivery (Silas 2002). 
 
The significance of the new urban water infrastructure to the image of the nation was such that 
the central government provided all of the money for the construction of Pejompongan I
6,  based on 
the argument that Jakarta’s water supply was part of the ‘national project’, and ‘not just for 
Jakartans’ (PAM Jaya, 1992a). Designating certain kinds of residential areas of the city as part of 
the ‘modern’ Jakarta (those that were ‘planned’, formal, and demonstrated ‘rational’ spatial 
arrangements along orderly roads), the old colonial neighbourhoods in the central areas of the city 
were laid with postcolonial pipes, and new neighbourhoods in the south were, upon construction, 
immediately included within the ‘modern strip’ of the city linked together through the network 
water supply. In contrast, large numbers of migrants moving to Jakarta during the 1950 and 1960s 
settled in open spaces of the city, with an increasing density gradually creating “vast block interiors 
that became the sites of the unserviced urban kampong” (Cowherd, 2002: 173). By the end of the 
1960s, it was estimated that only 15% of the city’s residents were served with a household 
connection (Pam Jaya 1992). Consumption was not metered, and rates were low; water was 
essentially being distribution ‘free of charge’ to consumers – largely in wealthier neighbourhoods. 
 
Jakarta’s water supply company, now known as PAM Jaya, had no explicit ‘social policy’ during 
this period. Rather, where the water supply distribution network was extended, this was largely to 
serve specific, symbolically ‘modern’ spaces and citizens: an elite residential area (Keborayan Baru
7), 
elevated highways and flyovers, Indonesia’s first ‘international standard’ hotel (Hotel Indonesia), 
the highrise developments along the main thoroughfare Jalan Thamrin-Sudirman, and the Asian 
Games Complex (Map 1). The piped network mirrors the above ground highways and flyovers built to 
connect the modern elements of the city, and was neatly positioned to channel water distribution to 
modern areas of the city, simultaneously excluding the vast majority of ‘unmodern’ spaces and 
populations thought to ‘lower the status of the nation’ (Abeyasekere, 1989), from both spatial 
proximity to, and services from, the network
8.  This national project was dedicated towards the 
creation of a “new [urban] space intended to be different from both colonial Batavia as well as the 
surrounding sea of poor urban neighbourhoods” (Kusno, 2000:52). The capital-intensive water 
treatment plants were two of the icons of modernity central to this larger project. 
 
Interpreting the Pejompongan I&II water treatment plants as primarily ‘modernist 
monuments’ explains why production capacity exceeded distribution capacity in the decades 
following independence (Martijn 2005). This also explains the limited provision of piped water 
outside of this symbolically modern space in the center of the city, and provides a partial 
                                                 
6 The central government later provided 50% of the costs of  Pejompongan II, with the government of Jakarta responsible 
for the other half of the US $7 million investment (PAM Jaya, 1992a). 
7 Kebayoran Baru, the ‘satellite town’ originally planned by Dutch post-war government in 1948, had already been fitted with 
17 km of network pipes prior to postcolonial government, and pipelines from Pejompongan I were laid to channel its new 
waters into these ‘modern urban dwellings’ (see maps).  
8 The construction of the Asian Games complex and adjacent inner-city thorough fare involved the removal of 47 000 
kampong residents, moving them out of the central areas of the city needed for these modernist monuments and relegating 
them to the periphery  (Abeyasekere, 1989), to which (as seen in Map 1) the water network did not yet extend. After the 
completion of Pejompongan I, piped water was reported to be available to only 12% of Jakarta’s population (Fischer, 1959). explanation for the lack of official concern about the fact that the majority of the urban 
population could not afford to connect to the network (Fischer, 1959). In other words, the 
persistent pattern of social and spatial differentiation of access to water supply in Jakarta should 
not be understood a sign of the failure of government to properly manage public infrastructure, but 
rather as a logical outcome of the state’s post-independence strategy of urban governance
9. 
 
2c Water for ‘development’ in the New Order period (1965 – 1990) 
 
The transition to the ‘New Order’ era government in 1965 inaugurated a new political vision for 
Indonesia amidst large-scale violence as the anti-communist regime of President Suharto was 
established (see Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003; Siegel, 1986; Robison 1990). The New Order regime 
established new urban water supply management goals: fiscal discipline, and facilitating economic 
growth through enabling Jakarta’s new role as the ‘gateway for trade and industrial development’ 
(Argo, 1999; Hill 1996; Robison 1990). These goals, in turn, guided both the growth of the network 
into certain ‘productive’ areas of the city, and justified a more ‘economically rational’ management 
of network water as an economic commodity.  
 
This focus was reflected in changes to the governance of Jakarta’s municipal water supply system. 
Prior to the mid 1960s, integrated records of actual consumption and numbers of customers were 
not maintained. Water was not metered and charges were very low; the resulting low rate of cost 
recovery meant that PAM Jaya was often unable to pay its employees (PAM Jaya, 1992a). Bringing a 
‘new order’ to the management of Jakarta’s network water supply, a regional water supply company 
(now known as PAM Jaya) was established in 1968
10, signalling the fact that water supply to Jakarta 
was no longer a ‘national project’, but a local government owned business mandated to support 
regional economic growth, and generate profits, while providing for the welfare of Jakarta’s 
residents through the provision of clean water. Water was now an economic commodity that should 
be paid for by those who directly benefited (the consumers), and the program of ‘meterasasi’ 
[metering] rolled out throughout the 1970s – installing meters, registering customers, and 




The priority given to the newly created water supply company’s role in fostering regional economic 
growth is most evident in the first (and only) major domestically financed infrastructure 
investment of the New Order period. As the only large scale water treatment plant built over a 
                                                 
9 Pejompongan I &II were each built at a cost of approximately $7 million US (current cost data) (PAM Jaya 1992a) This 
tends to be overlooked in the history of public infrastructure in Jakarta (see World Bank, 1974; Hamer et al., 1986; Chifos 
and Suselo, 2000). The familiar argument that Sukarno’s government neglected public infrastructure in favour of public 
monuments ignores the construction of Pejompongan I&II as both a ‘public’ infrastructure, and a monument for the 
modernization of the city.  
10 PAM Jaya (Perusahaan Air Minum – water supply company of Jakarta) took over responsibility for water supply from the 
Ministry of Public Works, which had built and was operating the first two water treatment plants. PAM Jaya changed from a 
‘regional company’ to the ‘local company’ of the government of DKI Jakarta in 1977 (see PAM Jaya, 1992a). 
11 During the program of ‘meterasasi’, illegal consumers were ‘legalized’ (then calculated to be receiving 40% of the water 
supply, see World Bank, 1974), the actual number of customers was registered (the first record is given in 1975), and water 
meters were installed, beginning the billing of consumers according to the volume of water consumed.  Average household 
water bills jumped from the previous flat rate of Rp 100-200/mth to Rp 2000-3000/mth (PAM Jaya, 1992a). twenty year period
12, Pulogadung (completed in 1982), and its accompanying (limited) network were 
built to serve the Pulogadung Industrial Estate, an area of the city that Suharto had targeted for 
the initiation of the New Order strategy of industry-led economic growth
13. Pulogadung’s 
production capacity has never been fully utilized (Jaya Raya, 1991); unsurprising, given that the 
locus of industrial activity had already spilled over into surrounding regions of Jakarta by the late 
1970s (Castles, 1989), and industrial users in Jakarta prefer to rely on groundwater sources, and 
industrial demand for a (relatively expensive) piped water supply has never been significant
14. But 
despite rapidly growing residential populations, stagnant industrial demand and underutilized 
production capacity, the Pulogadung distribution network in eastern Jakarta remained limited to 
industrial areas (Argo, 1999). Indeed, across Jakarta limited network extension was undertaken 
through the 1970s and 1980s (JICA, 1997). 
 
Where network extension did occur, this tended to focus on upper class residential areas. Partially 
subsidized by the central government
15, an expansion of the capacity of Pejompongan I &II water 
treatment plants
16  targeted the ‘modern’, largely affluent neighbourhoods developed in the colonial 
and early postcolonial eras (Menteng, Kebayoran Baru, Tebet). Primary pipelines laid down in the late 
1960s-early 1970s indicate the water flow directed into these upper class neighbourhoods (see Map 
1) and the modern strip of highrises, luxury hotels, and developments along the city’s center 
thorough-fare supported by this demographic. Network growth outside the central area of the city 
was targeted at high income residential neighbourhoods (Map 2)
17. Eight small-scale water 
treatment plants were built around the city; the criteria that they be ‘self-supporting’ (i.e. recover 
costs) constrained distribution largely to upper class residential and industrial areas (Tutuko 2005, 
Salim 2005). The first, (Cilandak) was completed in 1978 to upgrade service in Kebayoran Baru 
(PAM Jaya 1993); others were built in cooperation with real estate developers to serve new 
residential areas on the ‘rurban’ fringe of the rapidly expanding city (Martijn 2005). 
 
In stark contrast, urban kampongs remained largely excluded from the New Order’s ‘promise of 
development’ (Kusno, 2000; Jellinek, 1991). Although in the 1970s the kampongs housed 80% of 
                                                 
12 Pulogadung was the only large scale water treatment plant built during 1970-1990; while during this time period the 
population of Jakarta had increased by almost four million, other large scale treatment plants and network extension 
identified within the 1972 and 1985 Jakarta water supply master plan were deferred until the World Bank’s ‘PAM Jaya 
System Improvement Program’ (PJSIP), which ran from 1990-1997.  See JICA, 1997 and World Bank, 1998 for more details. 
13 There were 76 factories located in Pulogadung Industrial Estate by 1975, see Castles, 1989. 
14 The high commercial tariffs for piped water, coupled with the unsuccessfully regulated exploitation of alternative water 
sources providing a much cheaper supply have, have led to a preference of non-networked water by industry (see Adzan, 
2001). The actual percentage of total water from Pulogadung in the 1970-80s used by industries in the Industrial Estate is 
unknown, as consumption volumes per consumer are not recorded until the 1990s; a general estimate of industrial 
consumption usually assumes it to be 1/3
rd of total water supply production (JICA, 1997).  
15 Contradicting the new ‘economic rationality’ of urban water supply, which decreed local financing and payment by users, the 
central government continued to subsidize major investments into production oriented infrastructure (not distribution), by 
providing local government with low interest loans from international development funds. Upgrades to Pejompongan I&II 
were financed from loans from the Japanese government, who drew up the 1972 Master Plan (PAM Jaya, 1992). 
16Pejompongan I was expanded in 1967, and Pejompongan II was expanded in 1973 (see PAM Jaya, 1992)  
17 Most notably, Pondok Indah, the first ‘gated community’ built in Jakarta by the developer Ciputra and his New Order 
financier (Salim), was one of the few new areas of the city in the 1970s where the network was extended  Advertised as a 
‘residential enclave’, Pondok Indah is defined as purposefully distinct from its surrounding neighbourhood, and its spatial 
exclusivity was enhanced by its status as an ‘island of services’ amidst surrounding non-networked areas of Southern 
Jakarta. Cowherd (2002) describes how this spatial exclusion was ensured by the construction of a golf course and the re-
routing of a river, making Pondok Indah appear on the map as an island fortress surrounded by a moat. Jakarta’s population, and comprised 65% of its land area, 90% of its residents did not have access 
to piped water supply, leaving them to build their own shallow groundwater wells, or pay up to 20% 
of their monthly income for water from public hydrants (KIP, 1976; World Bank, 1974). And, while a 
program of ‘kampong improvement’ begun by Jakarta governor Ali Sadikin
18 did include water supply 
as a primary component of ‘upgrades’, the first decade of the Kampong Improvement Program (KIP) 
(1966-77) produced only marginal improvements in the access of lower income residents to piped 
water (Abeyasekere, 1987; Taylor 1983). Public hydrants were still a rare occurrence in kampongs in 
the 1970s (Argo, 1999). Sewerage systems were non-existence, a legacy of a government policy 
treating sewage as a ‘private concern’ (Argo 1999; Cowherd 2002). 
 
By the 1980s, concern had grown over low levels of potable water supply in Jakarta. The city’s 
population had reached 6 million and was continuing to grow rapidly. A reduction in networked and 
raw water quality had been documented since the 1960s. As the city grew, the lack of a sewerage 
system meant that surface water sources were increasingly contaminated by sewage and industrial 
effluent (PAM Jaya 1992a, 1992b). The lack of an effective waste collection system in the city 
exacerbated the situation, with household waste collecting in canals which provided water sources 
and flood drainage for the city (Porter 1994). Open canals, largely conduits for sewage, regularly 
overflowed into city streets during the rainy season. Water quality in the piped network (partially 
reliant on surface water sources within the city), and in shallow groundwater (the source for the 
majority of the city’s poor residents) was of particular concern. In other areas, groundwater 
depletion and/or salinisation had occurred, and poor residents were entirely reliant on water 
vendors. Reported cases of water-borne diseases rose; over the 1960s, reported cholera cases 
averaged 200 per year with one outbreak resulting in 1320 reported cases (BPP 1971).  
 
Compounding these concerns was the inefficiency of the water supply network and resulting 
reduction in revenues for PAM Jaya. Although water supply production had quadrupled during the 
New Order period (while the population of DKI Jakarta had merely doubled), production capacity 
was still insufficient for meeting the basic water supply requirements (50 L/p/d) of DKI’s 
population
19.  Moreover, the water supply distribution network was not capable of distributing the 
available water; production capacity had consistently oustripped distribution capacity since the 
1960s. From 1965 to the late 1980s, the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, and the 
construction of an additional large scale water treatment plant increased water supply production 
capacity three-fold, but by 1990 the water supply system still only delivered 40% of the potential 
volumes of treated water (JICA, 1997), and the provision of piped water supply still only extended 
to less than one-quarter of the city’s population (Porter, 1994).   
 
Accordingly, PAM Jaya developed its first major program to focus on water supply for the urban 
poor (the World Bank-financed Pam Jaya Supply Improvement Project, 1990 – 1997), which 
originally intended to install 2000 public hydrants in areas unserved by the network (largely in 
                                                 
18 KIP began as a local government initiative in 1966, 50% of the costs of improvements were paid for by the Jakarta 
government, and the other 50% were paid for by the residents of the improved kampong. In 1974 the World Bank took up 
KIP as a national development program, and funding came from the Bank and the Central government (see Karamoy, 1984; 
Darrundono 2000).  
19 In 1997, the total effective (i.e. operational) production capacity of PAM JAYA was estimated at about 17,000 l/s {JICA 
1997; WB 1998}. Distribution losses (essentially leakage) were reported at 56% (JICA 1997), resulting in a theoretical water 
availability of 140 litres per customer per day (assuming that all use is for residential) – taking into account industrial and 
commercial water use, this figures drops to 100 litres per person per day. North Jakarta) and provided household connections elsewhere in the city, resulting in 234,000 new 
connections {PAM JAYA 1992f; {WB 1998}. As a result, the coverage ratio in the ‘served area’ of 
DKI Jakarta increased to approximately 50% of the approximately 8.9 million inhabitants (WB 
1998). However, less than 200 of the target 2000 hydrants were installed, and poor quality of pipes 
(many of which were galvanized iron, an inappropriate material for Jakarta’s soil which quickly 
decayed) and poor workmanship undermined the sustainability of the new distribution networks (WB 
1998). Nonetheless, the expansion of production and distribution capacity did not catch up to 
increasing (potential) demand due to population growth: DKI Jakarta alone grew from 1.8 million 
people in 1950 to 6.5 million in 1980, and 11 million in 2005, with equally rapid population growth in 
the surrounding metropolitan areas (with the total population of the greater metropolitan area now 
estimated at 18 million), particularly at the expanding rural-urban fringe beyond the boundaries of 
DKI Jakarta (Chifos 2000; Firman 1997, 1998, 2000, Lo and Yeung 1996).  
 
Moreover, PAM Jaya’s rising block tariff structure provided the water supply company with a 
strong disincentive to connect the poor. Public hydrants – usually built in kampongs -- were charged 
higher volumetric tariffs than individual households, creating a counterintuitive cross-subsidy from 
poor to middle and upper class customers
20.. Banded tariff structures with a rising block tariff 
beginning with rates below production cost created a disincentive for providing direct network 
connections to poor customers, who would thereby pay lower amounts per unit volume, and perhaps 
decrease water company revenues (Whittington 1992). Even in areas with the possibility of network 
connections, higher tariffs (with the volumetric tariff doubling in less than a decade in real terms), 
higher connection charges, and a deposit fee meant a high initial fixed cost for a household water 
supply connection, prohibitive to poor households with low and often fluctuating incomes (section 3). 
The result was that only a small proportion of the new connections made in the 1990s were for very 
poor households. By the end of this period, only approximately 10% of kampong residents had 
household water connections (Azdan 2001, Cestti, 1994; Porter, 1994 and JICA, 1997)
21.  By the 
end of the 1990s, Jakarta’s official water supply coverage ratio remained one of the lowest in Asia 
(McIntosh 2003).  
 
                                                 
20 Until the early 1980s, household tariffs were 25 Rp/m3 for the first 15 m3/mth; public hydrants and water trucks paid Rp 
60/m3, more than double the tariff of households, and more than even small businesses (who paid 50 Rp/m3). (Perpamsi 
1975a, 1975b, 1975c) 
21 Reported figures vary significantly, due to reasons discussed in section 3.1. 3. Disconnected: Poverty and access to water supply in contemporary Jakarta  
 
The previous section discussed underlying political and economic drivers for low coverage rates and 
differentiation of access to water supply: the reaffirmation of Dutch sovereignty and racial 
superiority, as concretized in the provision of artesian, and later networked water supply solely to 
colonial (white) neighbourhoods; the post-Independence approach to water treatment plants as 
‘monumental architecture’ serving ‘modern’ areas of the city; followed by the New Order period 
which emphasized the build-up of productive capacity, and an increase in efficiency of networked 
urban services for the city’s high income elites. This section focuses, in contrast, on water suppliers 
and customers, presenting data on poverty and access to water supply in Jakarta (section 3a), and 
exploring the disincentives both for poor consumers to choose network connections (section 3b), 
and for the water supply utility to connect poor households (section 3c).  
 
3a. Contemporary water supply in Jakarta: the spatial and social dimensions of poverty and 
access to water supply 
 
Numerous studies conducted by academics and multilateral organizations have characterized 
Jakarta’s water and sanitation sector as one of the weakest in Asia (Brennan and Richardson 1989; 
Leitmann 1995; McIntosh 2003; McGranahan et al 2001; World Bank 2004). Official estimates of 
the proportion of the city’s population with water supply network connections in the home 
(‘household connections’) range from 46% to 56% (BPS 2005; Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory 
Body 2004)
22. Unofficial estimates, which attempt to account for the large number of informal 
residents in the city, estimate that only 25% of DKI Jakarta’s true population is being served 
{Tutuko 2005}. Domestic water consumption is estimated to be between 70 and 80 L per capita per 
day -- one of the lowest of the 18 large Asian cities surveyed by the ADB in 2002 (ADB 2003b; 
McIntosh 2003).  
 
Those not connected to Jakarta’s municipal water supply system rely on a variety of sources (rivers 
and streams, lakes, rainwater, shallow and deep wells), and distribution methods (private household 
wells or rainwater collection systems, water vendors, bottled water, standpipes, private localized 
networks connected to deep wells, and water trucks) ((Berry 1982; Gilbert and James 1994; Lovei 
and Whittington 1993; McGranahan et al 2001). Many of these water supply methods are more 
expensive, per unit volume, than piped water supply (Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
22 The first figure is taken from the annual SUSENAS socio-economic survey conducted by the Indonesia Bureau of 
Statistics (BPS 2005). The second figure was calculated using data from the regulatory authority overseeing the 
management of Jakarta’s water supply system (Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body 2004). This was cross-
referenced with ADB (2003b) which reports a figure of 51.2%. In Jakarta, coverage ratios are always imprecise 
estimates; their calculation is dependent upon a number of variables which are only imprecisely measured, such as 
urban population and average size of household. Reported figures vary significantly, and do not indicate the number of 
households which have a connection but which rely primarily on other sources (e.g. groundwater) due to quality or 
service concerns (e.g. low pressure). Large numbers of seasonal migrants and ‘illegal’ residents without land tenure 
mean that population figures are systematically underestimated and that coverage figures are systematically 
inflated.   
 
 In many instances, alternative water sources are contaminated to a degree that compromises public 
health.  Jakarta has almost no sewer system (with less than 2% of households connected to a 
sewerage system) (ADB 2003b); the vast majority of wastewater is disposed directly to rivers, 
canals, or to (often poorly functioning) septic tanks (Crane 1994, McIntosh 2003; Surjadi 2002). 
Contamination by wastewater and industrial effluent, as well as salinisation due to seawater 
infiltration due to over-pumping have polluted Jakarta’s shallow aquifer -- the sole household source 
of supply for many poorer families – in many areas of the city. Rivers and canals are usually too 
polluted to use even for washing clothing. Nor is the water delivered through the network potable; 
medical studies repeatedly find faecal coliform contamination, and residents are advised to boil 
their water.  The public health impacts of this situation are predictable, and have been well-
documented: high rates of water-related diseases, including gastrointestinal illness due to 
contaminated water and parasite-related illnesses due to poor drainage, particularly in poorer areas 
(Agtini et al 2005; Leitmann 1995; McGranahan et al 2001; Simanjuntak et al 2001; Surjadi 2003). 
Results of the first community-based surveillance study of diarrhoea in Jakarta found results that 
correlated with Indonesia-wide findings: that diarrhoeal is the third leading cause of morbidity and 
leading cause of morbidity in infants (Agtini et al 2005).  
 
The correlation between poverty and lack of access to a household connection has been documented 
in household surveys of Jakarta (Crane 1994, Forkami/RTI 2002, 2003; McGranahan et al 2001, 
Shofiani 2005). National-level data indicate that the urban poor lack access to water supply across 
Indonesia. Data from Indonesia’s census indicates that only 16% of the urban ‘very poor’ (with 
monthly incomes of Rupiah 800,000 (approximately $80 USD)) have household connections, while 
36% of the urban population is connected, on average, across the country (Woodcock 2005). Poorer 
households often use sources of water which are more expensive per unit volume (although not 
necessarily more expensive in terms of total costs – see section 3.2), and spend higher proportions 
of income on water (Figures 1 and 2, and Table 1). As Figure 2 indicates, continuity of income 
(which is particularly relevant for poor households, whose income may fluctuate significantly weekly 
or even daily) also influences choice of water sources: households with fluctuating incomes are more 
likely to rely solely on vended water.  
 
Although significant attention has been given to the relationship between poverty and lack of 
access to clean water, much less attention has been paid to the spatial differentiation of access 
across the city. As a result of historical choices (see section 2), the network is concentrated in 
‘modern’, formally planned areas of the central city and surrounding upper-class residential areas, 
recalling a scattered ‘archipelago’ rather than a homogenous network (Bakker 2003b) Areas of 
lower penetration of the network, are correlated with income
23 (Map 3). Moreover, spatial 
variations in infrastructure quality and pressure are correlated with poorer areas of the city. Map 
                                                 
23 Booth (1997) explores the question of the reliability and meaningfulness of poverty statistics in several south-east 
Asian countries, including Indonesia. Booth notes that household surveys constitute the main method for estimating 
poverty rates, but that these surveys are characterized by a number of problems, including a substantial divergence 
between income and expenditure data (with the latter often being reported as lower than the former), and disparities 
between personal consumption as reported in household surveys and as derived from national accounts. She concludes 
that household surveys may be unreliable, and/or have drawn on unrepresentative samples. Temporary migration into the 
city and high rates of informal settlements further complicate accurate assessments of poverty rates. Accordingly, we 
use the survey results on numbers of slum households as a proxy for poverty. These statistics were gathered through 
reports from local government officials (RW and RT heads). 
 4 indicates zones of low pressure in the network; in these areas, access to water through the 
network is either highly unreliable or completely unavailable due to low pressure
24. On a 
neighbourhood basis, then, access to water supply is spatially differentiated across Jakarta, and 
strongly correlated with income. 
 
The spatial differentiation of access has a micro-geography with a high resolution. Even in areas 
with network penetration of tertiary pipes, lower-income streets and houses are unlikely to have 
access (Map 5). Assessing access of the urban poor to water supply is complicated by Jakarta’s 
spatial pattern of urban development and urban services provision. Within the city, an ‘estate’ 
pattern of blocks of commercial properties and colonial-era mansions fronting on broad avenues is 
intermixed with dense ‘illegal’ settlements of poorly serviced houses and self-built dwellings in the 
inner blocks (Cowherd 2002; Ford 1993; Leaf 1996, Porter 1996), on empty lots, and along any 
streets wide enough to accommodate built structures while still permitting the passage of traffic, a 
pattern originating in ‘indische’ (Dutch-Javanese) urban planning models which has intensified 
following the informalisation of much of the city’s economy following currency devaluation in 1998 
(Cowherd 2002). Many neighbourhoods do not have any access to piped water, as the water 
network is concentrated in wealthier areas of the city (Martijn 2005). The resulting spatial 
differentiation of land use and income has created an ‘urban dualism’, with middle-class houses 
abutting informal housing in a highly variable urban micro-geography in which multiple water sources 
will be in use simultaneously.  
 
 
3b. Choosing household water supplies/Disincentives for the poor to connect 
 
In this section, we discuss choices which households make about water sources, and the 
disincentives which discourage poor consumers from connecting to the water supply system. Our 
evidence is drawn from primary survey data
25, and is supported by references to other published 
survey data.  
 
Poor households in Jakarta choose non-networked water sources for a variety of reasons (Bakker, 
forthcoming)
26. Understanding choices about water use must be situated in context; in Jakarta, as 
in many mega-cities in the South, most residents use multiple sources of water in the home (Table 
2). Residents of Jakarta obtain their water supply through a complex, heterogeneous set of 
sources, techniques, and modes of delivery. Few residents rely on one source, using a combination of 
household piped network water connections, shallow and deep wells, public hydrants, and water 
vendors for their water supply needs (Surjadi 2002, 2003). According to our survey of 110 
households in six Jakarta neighbourhoods in 2005, 61% of households surveyed used multiple 
                                                 
24 Note that 20% of PSP customers are zero consumption customers – many of these many be in low or no pressure zones (or 
be wealthy customers who simply have the supply as a backup).  
25 Surveys of 110 households conducted in eleven kelurahan (sub-districts) in North (Kamal Muara, Penjaringan (Marlina & 
Gedong Kompa), Penjaringan (Rawa Bebek), Pegangsaan Dua ), West (Semanan), East (Kampung Melayu, Rawa Terate, Jati, 
Kampung Tengah) and Central Jakarta (Kebon Melati, Gunung Sahari Selatan). These kelurahan were identified as 
predominantly poor and targeted for delivery of water services by the Kimpraswil Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation 
program, created to offset the impacts of a reduction in fuel subsidies on poor households.   
26 For a history of the ongoing preferences of the poor, see: Taylor, 1983; Yayasan Dian Desa, 1989; Kreimer et al. 1995; 
Chifos, 1996; Surjadi et al. 1998, and Surjadi et al. 1994. sources (the three most frequent combinations being network and vended water, network and 
groundwater, and groundwater and vended water)
27.  
 
Use of different water sources varies temporally and seasonally, due to quality and pressure 
concerns. Low pressure in the piped network means that households prefer to have a backup source 
– usually a shallow well. In many areas of the city, however, both shallow and deep groundwater 
cannot be used for drinking due to salinisation and pollution of the shallow aquifer (due to pumping, 
sea-level intrusion, and surface wastewater disposal in the absence of a sewerage system); 
groundwater in these areas is usually used only for cleaning/washing, to offset total household 
expenses on water. 
 
Even in those areas with networked water supply, many homes will not have individual household 
connections. Susantono finds, in an extensive survey, that informal water services “thrive” in 
neighbourhoods where formal services are available, with households relying on water vendors even 
when they have the option of house connections with the municipal water utility (Susantono 2001). 
Households rely on water vendors even when they have the possibility of a direct house connection 
to the network. In other words, physical proximity of the network (as indicated by the distribution 
of tertiary pipe networks in the neighbourhood) is not correlated with residential network 
connections. 
 
Why would this be the case? The answer is that the choice of which source to use is influenced by 
factors other than physical availability of a network: total cost of water supply; transaction costs; 
housing and residence status; and, in some instances, perceptions of water quality. The most 
important factor to consider is the total cost of water supply (as distinct from the volumetric 
cost, or cost per unit volume of water). In a pattern typical of third world cities (Cairncross et al 
1990, Gulyani 2005, Swyngedouw 1997), piped water supply costs less per unit volume in Jakarta 
than other modes of water supply, particularly vended water. In comparisons of the prices of 
vendor water versus networked water supply, the price per unit volume was found to be from 10 
times to 32 times more expensive in the case of vendor water
28. Poor households typically rely on 
vendor water, whereas wealthier households have access to the networked water supply system; as 
a result, many poor households pay more per unit volume of water than do wealthier residents of 
the city. Given their lower incomes, many poor households pay a much higher proportion of their 
income for water than do wealthier households. In our survey of 110 households, 43% of households 
spent more than 5% of their income on water bills (often cited as appropriate threshold by 
international aid organizations)
29. Wealthier households with a networked connection, in other 
words, receive water at a lower cost per unit volume, spending lower proportions of income for much 
greater quantities of water. Unsurprisingly, levels of water consumption are positively correlated 
with wealth in Jakarta (McGranahan et al 2001).   
 
                                                 
27 These findings are similar to the results of surveys conducted by Surjadi (1994, 2002, 2003) and McGranahan et al 
(2001), the two most recent academic studies available. 
28 ADB (2003); McGranahan et al (2001); and a survey conducted by the author in the neighbourhood of Sunter Agung in 
January 2001. ADB 2003b gives a maximum figure of US $4.17/m3 
29 A study of 1000 households in Jakarta which examined the different prices paid by different wealth groups found that, 
overall, the poor pay on average twice as much per metre cubed as the wealthy (McGranahan et al 2001), and that water 
expenditure represents, on average, 10% of income in poor households. 
 On the basis of cost per unit volume alone, then, it seems counter-intuitive that poor households 
would not connect to the water supply network where possible. However, the disincentive for 
connection becomes more obvious when we consider the total cost of connecting to the water supply 
system (as opposed to price per unit volume of water supply). Monthly bills include more than 
charges per unit volumes of water consumed. Fixed charges (such as the meter fee and the annual 
charge) are also added on to the bill (Table 3). For a poor household whose residents consume 50 
L/person/day (the World Health Organization recommended minimum), the fixed charges will be 
anywhere from 5 to 10 times as high as the volumetric consumption charge; the effective cost per 
unit volume will thus be higher than that of vended water for the poorest consumers. Moreover, a 
networked water supply implies additional infrastructure costs to be borne by the consumer, in the 
form of a water tank or holding device, made necessary because of the intermittent nature of 
water supply through the piped network (with cutoffs of several hours occurring daily in some 
areas).  
 
Finally, connection fees may be prohibitive (ranging from 200,000 to 350,000 Rupiah in the 
households surveyed, with reported figures from other surveys sometimes much higher than this), 
relative to average incomes of poor households (which averaged 1.4 million Rupiah/month in the 
households surveyed), and must usually be provided as a lump sum; which may pose significant 
barriers to households with small, irregular incomes. Connection fees also vary depending on 
distance from the network; poor households are more likely to live in areas of lower network 
density (see discussion in section 3a), and thus to pay higher fees for connecting. For all of these 
reasons, overall costs to poor households of vended water may be lower than networked water 
supply, even though the latter has a lower price per unit volume.  
  
Transaction costs are also significant; long waiting times at water utility offices to pay bills and 
clear up meter mis-readings raise transaction costs compared to the ease of complaint handling and 
convenience of home visits by vendors to collect bill payments. Moreover, payment flexibility 
permitted by vendors (some of whom even allow customers to buy water on credit); this is an 
important incentive for poor households, which may have limited budgeting ability, to choose vended 
water over networked water (Susantono 2001; Shofiani 2003). Although difficult to estimate, 
bribes demanded by contractors and PAM Jaya staff (or the apprehension that such bribes may be 
demanded) is another important transaction cost
30.  
 
A third factor is housing and residency status. A significant proportion of the city’s population 
lives in rental or temporary (often self-built) accommodation without secure tenure. Deep wells are 
expensive and have higher maintenance costs, which effectively prohibits development by those 
without permanent tenure. Moreover, landlords are often unwilling to connect rental properties 
because of concerns about infrastructure cost and maintenance; similarly, tenants are unwilling to 
connect, because their investment would constitute an upgrade to the landlord’s property. In our 
survey, households with insecure tenure were less likely to have a household water supply 
connection (Figure 4). In addition, a large number of the migrants to the city are without legal 
residency permits. In these instances, water vendors – which provide flexible, easily accessible, ‘no 
questions asked’ water supply – are preferable.  
                                                 
30 See Cowherd, 2002 for a discussion of the culture of ‘informal’ profits from public services, and Yayasan Dian Desa, 1989 
for how this was evident in PAM Jaya’s operations in poorer communities.  
Perceptions of water quality may also factor in to the decision not to connect to the water supply 
network. In our survey, networked water was perceived by a majority of respondents to be of 
higher quality than other sources of water (particularly groundwater), particularly by more 
educated respondents. However, some respondents did perceive groundwater to be of higher quality 
than either vended or network water. Indeed, the most comprehensive comparative survey of water 
quality of different sources in poor neighbourhoods in Jakarta to date found that samples of 
drinking water from the network were more contaminated with fecal coliform than groundwater 
(Surjadi et al 1994). In other cases, vended water was perceived to be of higher quality than 
networked water supply. The fact that vendors check water quality and may strain the water or let 
it settle before delivering explains why perceptions of vended water quality may be higher, despite 
the fact that vendor water often originates in hydrants connected to the networked water supply 
system. These perceptions of relative water quality of different sources may not, however, be 
borne out in all cases; groundwater quality tends to be lower in poorer areas, due to proximity to 
industrial sites, fewer controls over sewage, density, and infiltration of seawater (particularly in 
North Jakarta). Dislike of chlorine (as borne out by the widespread practice of leaving buckets of 
water to sit overnight to dissipate the chemical content) is another contributing factor 
(McGrahanan et al 2001, and Kreimer et al 1995). Ironically, wealthier households can afford to 
treat water (via household filters), and thus often choose to access groundwater, reducing the 
number of wealthier households connected to the network, and decreasing the possibility for cross-
subsidies within the tariff regime.  
 
In summary, given their lack of secure land tenure, variable daily income levels, tenuous legal status 
(lack of residency permits), and inability to cope with large transaction costs and formal billing 
systems, poor residents of Jakarta, like in the colonial era, continued to persist in their ‘irrational’ 
preference of ‘local waters’ – which provide reliable, flexible, easily accessible, ‘no questions asked’ 
water supply
31. In other words, in contemporary Jakarta as colonial Batavia, poor residents of the 
city may not only be excluded, but also may not choose to be connected
32. 
 
3c Disincentives for water supply utilities to connect the poor 
 
PAM Jaya, like other Indonesian water supply utilities, operates with several disincentives to 
connect poor customers. First, the culture of governance within urban government in Indonesia 
does not prioritise the poor (Kusno 1997; Woodcock 2005). The ways in which this low priority has 
been expressed have changed over time. In recent decades, low priority was placed on the provision 
of piped water and partially rationalized as a policy to discourage rural migrants, who were blamed 
for over-taxing the city’s public services (KIP, 1976). However, this is not the sole reason; 
coordination with PAM Jaya to extend piped water supply into poorer neighbourhoods did not 
greatly improve after the ‘closed city’ policy was relaxed in 1976 (Taylor 1983). A more fundamental 
                                                 
31 For a history of the ongoing preferences of the poor, see: Taylor, 1983; Yayasan Dian Desa, 1989; Kreimer et al. 1995; 
Chifos, 1996; Surjadi et al. 1998, and Surjadi et al. 1994. 
32 This ambiguous relationship of the city’s residents to the water supply network is not confined to the poor. As the water 
supply system founders under the weight of Korupsi, Kollusi and Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism), substantial 
middle class sections of the city have also opted out of the network, either refusing to have a connection or refusing to 
consume. Approximately 20% of the water network customers in Jakarta are ‘zero consumption’ customers who have turned 
to other sources of water supply - a potent symbol of widespread political and economic disconnection from the network. issue is the lack of a legal requirement mandating utilities to target services to the poor. This is 
compounded by intermediary institutions between PAM Jaya workers and poor residents (Woodcock 
2005); poor residents may be distrustful of PAM Jaya staff (as with any government officials in 
Indonesia), and staff may be reluctant to deal with the poor because of their low social capital (lack 
of ability to fill out forms, lack of understanding of rules, possibility inability to pay). Political 
leaders, on the other hand, are sometimes unaware of the numbers of unconnected residents, or 
the cost to the unconnected poor of obtaining water from alternative sources (Woodcock 2005) or 
do not choose to prioritise these issues (unsurprising, given the low degree of political influence of 
the urban poor). 
 
A second reason for the under-provision of networked water supply in the kampongs has been cost 
recovery, the requirement that PAM Jaya fully recover costs from customers
33 (Taylor, 1983), 
exacerbated during some periods with budgetary requirements to direct retained earnings to a 
dividend paid to the utility, rather than reinvested in infrastructure (Woodcock 2005)
34. The utility 
preferred to limit the extension of distribution networks to neighbourhoods where the ‘user-fee’ 
schemes used to finance network extension meant that costs could reliably be recovered
35. The 
discriminatory social policy of PAM Jaya during this period is reflected in its own admission that it 
was “best situated to serve well established, formal areas comprising concentrated groups of users, 
rather than newly developed and widely scattered areas [i.e. kampongs].” (Argo, 1999: 71). The 
limited ability of PAM Jaya to extend water supply network in to poor areas is corroborated in the 
latest Master Plan for Jakarta’s water supply which records the absence of a poverty reduction 
strategy in network extension policy until the late 1980s (JICA, 1997), and notes the absence of 
policy targets for supply coverge (in % terms of total DKI population) until the 1970’s (WB 1991). 
Indeed, PAM Jaya’s reported coverage figures for the city were usually stated as proportions of 
the total population in the ‘served area’, excluding kampongs altogether.  
 
A third set of disincentives stems from urban governance. Official development plans for Jakarta 
encouraged an east-west pattern of urban development, attempting to avoid expansion into 
irrigated agricultural areas north and south of the city (JICA 1997). Despite the failure of planning 
controls to stem urban sprawl, network expansion was limited to target zones in official planning. A 
second governance factor was the influence of informal, and reputedly violent ‘water mafia’ which 
profited from local water vending, and actively discouraged attempts to install distribution 
networks or substitute household water connections for water hydrants (Crane 1994; {Pandjaitan 
2004}). 
 
A fourth set of disincentives arises in the business model and associated governance culture of 
Indonesian water supply utilities (Woodcock 2005). Water utilities in Indonesia are controlled by 
local government; senior appointments are often guided by political patronage rather than technical 
                                                 
33 World Bank, 1974; Taylor, 1983 and Kreimer et al. 1995 record how the ‘basic needs’ development programs in the 1970s 
and 1980s that intended to provide ‘water for the poor’ through public hydrants were often frustrated.  
34 For PDAMS across Indonesia, the standard level of this dividend is 55% of net profits, which is paid to the treasury of 
the local municipality. 
35 The use of ‘user-fees’ to finance network extension meant that house connections were unaffordable for the majority of 
the population; the cost of a household connection (not to mention ‘additional fees’, meter rental, deposit, and actual monthly 
tariffs) in 1975 was Rp 100 000 ($200 US), whereas the average income in Jakarta at that time was only Rp 15 000/mth 
(approximately $36 US), with the 80% of the city’s residents living in kampongs earning much less than that amount (KIP, 
1976; Perpamsi, 1975a).  requirements. Employment in a water utility in Indonesia has conventionally been allocated a low 
social status (Martijn 2005), and the associated impacts on morale and technical expertise of staff 
have undermined the efficiency and productivity of most water utilities in Indonesia. Moreover, 
local governments have typically been unwilling or unable to make politically unpopular decisions 
(such as raising tariffs) or require water utilities to improve performance (e.g. through measurable 
performance targets). The treatment of water utilities as ‘cash cows’ (notably through the payment 
of annual dividends to the municipality) has distorted long-term planning processes, reducing 
investment in infrastructure maintenance and renewal.  
 
In short, both water suppliers and poor customers have powerful incentives not to connect to the 
water supply network in addition to lack of spatial access to the network. This explains why 
alternative water sources such as water vendors flourish even in areas with access to the network. 
Moreover, the disincentives for the urban poor to obtain household connections reveal why public 
hydrants and vended water tend to become the sole or primary source of drinking water supply for 
the city’s poor; Surjadi et al found that over 20% of the city’s residents regularly buy drinking 
water from vendors (Surjadi et al 1994). The most recent academic survey found that 
approximately 1/3 of Jakarta’s households purchase water from street vendors (Crane and Daniere 
1996); these figures correspond with the results of our household survey, which found that 31% of 
respondents regularly bought vended water (Table 2). This ambivalent relationship of the city’s 
residents to the water supply network is not confined to the poor. Substantial middle class sections 
of the city have also opted out of the network, either refusing to have a connection or refusing to 
consume. According to the private water concessionaires operating in Jakarta, approximately 20% 
of the water network customers in Jakarta are ‘zero consumption’ customers who have turned to 
other sources of water supply  - a potent symbol of widespread political and economic disconnection 
from the network. 
 
 
 4. Market failure, state failure: Public and private sectors serving the poor 
 
Conventional explanations for the lack of access to sufficient amounts of safe water 
supplies in urban areas in developing countries usually rest on concepts of either ‘state failure’ or 
‘market failure’ (see section 4 of this report), the former lending support to private sector 
involvement in water supply, and the latter justifying public sector-run water supply utilities. In 
both cases, lack of finance and weak governance are seen to be key contributing factors to the 
failure to extend water supply services (McIntosh 2003).These views are usually assumed to be 
mutually exclusive; the ensuing debate about public versus private sector management of water 
supply has been, as a result, highly polarized. Jakarta is an interesting case study of these issues: it 
has one of lowest rates of provision of water supply and sanitation services in Asia; and has one of 
the largest water supply ‘private sector participation’ (PSP) contracts in the South to date.  
 
Proponents of private sector participation (PSP) in water supply have argued that PSP is a means of 
improving service delivery to the poor (see, for example, Cross and Morel 2005; Nickson and 
Franceys 2003)
36, critical in a world in which an estimated one billion people – the ‘unserved’ in 
development jargon -- lack access to safe, sufficient water supplies (WHO 2000). Specifically, 
through efficiency gains, improved management, and better access to finance than public utilities, 
private companies improve performance (including cost recovery rates) and increase access through 
extending networks and providing new connections to previously ‘unserved’ customers. This will 
benefit the poor, particularly in urban areas, who are often served by a variety of informal 
arrangements such as water vendors, and typically pay much higher prices per unit volume for 
poorer quality water than wealthier consumers (Johnstone and Wood 2001; Shirley 2002, World 
Bank 1994, 1997, 2004a). 
 
Opponents of private sector participation argue that PSPs are not reliable mechanisms to supply 
water services to the poor, because private companies are unable to supply the poor on profitable 
terms. As proof, critics point to the withdrawal of the private sector from contracts and regions of 
the world, in light of risk-return ratios which have remained unacceptably high (Hall and Lobina, this 
volume; Hukka and Katko 2003, Smith 2002)
37, in part because of the low ‘ability to pay’ of poor 
consumers. Moreover, some critics argue that the potential contributions and sustainability of 
private sector involvement will be undermined by political conflict and civil society resistance to 
PSPs arising from the belief that water is a human right. Indeed, mobilization of social movements 
in opposition to PSPs has occurred in many countries, at times resulting in the cancellation of 
contracts by governments (La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia). In other cases, such as Manila, the 
opposition of social movements has factored into the decision of the private company to withdraw  
(Barlow and Clarke 2002, McDonald and Ruiters 2005, Shiva 2002, Trawick 2003, Swyngedouw 
2005, Wateraid 2003). Many of these critics argue that PSPs are not ethically appropriate, and call 
                                                 
36 See, for example, the Global Water Partnership (www.gwpforum.org/) and the World Water Council  
(www.worldwatercouncil.org/), two influential networks of private water companies, governments, and lending agencies. The 
Business Partners for Development links the World Bank with private water companies and governments, and ‘aims to produce 
solid evidence of the positive impact’ of PSPs (www.bpdweb.org). 
37 For academic studies critical of the privatisation process, with a focus on developing countries, see the Municipal Services 
Project website (http://qsilver.queensu.ca/~mspadmin). For an international public sector union perspective, see the very 
comprehensive PSIRU website (www.psiru.org). For a campaigning NGO perspective, see the Council of Canadians Blue Planet 
Project (www.canadians.org/blueplanet/index2.html) and the US-based Public Citizen’s campaign on water supply 
(http://www.citizen.org/cmep/Water/). for the management of water as a commons, often with reference to idealized models of indigenous 
water governance. Even where critics agree, in principle, to the management of water by the private 
sector, they argue that political conflict over the socio-economic identity of water will further 
elevate risks, and decrease the likelihood of the private sector being able to supply the poor on a 
profitable basis.  
 
Much of the debate on the relative merits of public or private sector involvement in water 
supply management has been (often implicitly) based on concepts of ‘market failure’ and ‘state 
failure’. According to the ‘market failure’ hypothesis, a certain class of goods exists for 
which markets fail to efficiently allocate goods and services, due to the ‘failure’ to meet 
assumptions of standard neoclassical economic models. Specifically, market failures occur 
when property rights are not clearly defined or are unenforceable, when goods are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous (‘public goods’), when prices do not incorporate full costs or 
benefits (‘externalities’, which may be negative (pollution) or positive (public health 
benefits)), when information is incomplete, or in a situation of monopoly which arises when 
supply by one firm entails lower costs than supply by more than one firm, giving an 
overwhelming cost advantage to the incumbent firm (‘natural monopoly’) (Cowan 1993, 
Winpenny 1994). Accordingly, the health and hygiene effects of lack of access to water, 
together with the tendency of private companies to fail to extend coverage to the poor (both 
as a result of the tendency to cherry-pick profitable neighbourhoods and classes of 
consumers, and the high prices and poor services resulting in a situation of natural monopoly), 
were two of the most important justifications for bringing water supply under the control of 
the state, through the creation of regulatory oversight mechanisms. In addition to the 
‘market failure’ argument, the symbolic and cultural importance of water as a (partially) non-
substitutable resource essential for life, its strategic political and territorial importance, the 
intense conflicts that arise over the use of a flow resource required to fulfil multiple 
functions (agricultural, industrial, drinking water, environmental), and the need in 
industrialized, urbanized societies to mobilize large volumes — invariably at a high cost 
relative to the economic value generated, implying large, long-term capital investment 
requirements which private companies were not always willing to assume — have been used, 
particularly in the 20th century, to justify public-sector investment and ownership.  
 
In contrast, according to the ‘state failure’ hypothesis, governments are inherently less 
efficient than the private sector; as a result, service delivery should preferably be undertaken 
by private companies, with the state acting as a regulator rather than service provider. Forms 
of governance characteristic of governments, it is argued, are not conducive to well-managed 
water supply utilities: burdensome public sector procurement procedures increase the cost and 
reduce the efficiency of provision; short-term political cycles undermine the long-term 
planning necessary for capital-intensive water infrastructure; corruption further reduces 
efficiency and cost-recovery; and politically expedient pricing strategies (many of which offer 
tariff options below marginal cost to the poor) are often counter-productive, either reducing 
cost-recovery rates, or providing disincentives for connecting poor households – loss-making 
customers for the utility (see, for example, Whittington 1992). The lack of transparency and 
attenuated accountability characteristic of ‘big bureaucracy’ reduces consumers’ ability to 
demand improvements to poor services. The result is a ‘vicious cycle’: low cost recovery, low 
revenue, low investment, and low levels of service (Bakker 2003a; Cross and Morel 2005; Nunan and Satterthwaite 2001). Proponents of the ‘state failure’ hypothesis have used these 
arguments to justify private sector involvement in water supply. Contemporary development 
economists often argue that networked water supply is subject to fewer market failures than 
water in its natural state: property rights are fairly straightforward to define; water supply is 
excludable and (in some instances) rivalrous, and competition can be introduced through direct 
competition through competitive bidding for network management or through indirect 
competition-simulating mechanisms such as yardstick regulation (Helm and Jenkinson 1998).  
Remaining market failures, such as externalities, can be limited or eliminated through better 
pricing and more comprehensive information about water supply systems and the ecosystems 
upon which they depend.  
 
Recent debate internationally has moved away from these polarized positions, acknowledging the 
limitations of conventional models of both public and private sector water supply management. The 
chapter on water supply in the 2003 Human Development Report states, for example, that “public 
provision of social services is not always the best solution when institutions are weak and 
accountability for the use of public resources is low—often the case in developing countries (UNDP 
2003, 111), yet acknowledges that private companies  “sometimes also view poor people as being 
unprofitable [and] some private companies have found ways of excluding poor people from service” 
(UNDP 2003, 116). In a recent study of private sector provision of urban services provision to the 
poor, the Asian Development Bank states that: “the private sector is not willing or able to solve the 
problems of unserved areas on its own” (ADB 2003a 56). Analysis of the discourse of the public 
statements of senior executives of water supply services firms reveals a retreat from earlier 
commitments to pursuing PSPs globally, with senior figures publicly acknowledging high risks and low 
profitability in supplying the poor (Robbins 2003). Britain’s influential economic weekly The 
Economist has warned of a ‘retreat of the private sector’ from water supply in developing countries 
(The Economist 2004). High-profile cancellations of water supply concession contracts by major 
private companies and/or governments in the past three years -- including Buenos Aires, La Paz, and 
Manila -- seem to bear this out. 
 
Simultaneously, civil society groups have been calling for greater recognition of the role of civil 
society in successful water supply delivery, either as an alternative which excludes privatization 
(TNI 2005), or as an approach which complements private sector activity through, for example, 
‘‘public-private-community partnerships’ (PPCPs)’ (BPD 2005; World Bank 2004a). These 
developments have raised concerns that the contribution of the private sector to reaching the UN’s 
Millenium Development Goals (the new goalposts of the international development agenda) for water 
will be relatively limited
38. In response, a debate about how best to implement a ‘pro-poor’ agenda 
through PSPs has arisen amongst consumers, governments, donors, and private water companies 
(see, for example, Franceys and Weitz 2003; Gutierrez et al 2003).  
 
This section engages with these debates through a case study of the private sector participation 
(PSP) contract for Jakarta’s water supply management sector , and through an analysis of recent, 
separate public and private sector initiatives to supply water to the poor in Jakarta. Section 4a 
provides background on the private sector participation contract for Jakarta’s water supply sector, 
                                                 
38 The eight United Nations Millenium Development Goals were agreed upon at the UN Millenium Summit (2000). The MDGs 
set a specific target for water supply: reducing by half the proportion of individuals without sustainable access to adequate 
quantities of affordable and safe water by 2015. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. one of the largest such contracts in Asia to date
39. The performance of the private sector with 
respect to network connections for poor households in Jakarta is analyzed in section 4b. The 
analysis concludes that the Jakarta PSP contract has not been pro-poor: new connections were 
preferentially targeted at middle and upper-income households over the period 1998 to 2005, and 
the numbers of new connections have been lower than the original targets. Section 4c argues that 
the failure to connect the poor is not solely attributable to the private operators, and identifies 
disincentives to provide individual network connections to poor households on the part of the 
municipality, the private concessionaires and poor households. In contrast to the economic 
reductionism of much of the literature on ‘pro-poor’ water supply, the analysis identifies a range of 
non-economic factors which must also be taken into account in explaining the failure to connect poor 
households to the water supply network. To document how these barriers affect both the public 
and the private sector, section 4d examines pro-poor water delivery strategies enacted by the 
private sector concessionaires over the period 2001 – 2005. 
 
4a. The private sector contract 
 
Jakarta’s government exhibited a renewed interest in the urban environment and services provision 
in the 1990s, as typified by the then-governor’s favourite slogan for Jakarta: ‘Bersih, Manusiawi, 
Wibawa’ (Clean, Humane, Powerful) (Leaf 1996). Concerns about the poor level of service in the 
water sector had persisted for decades, and water shortages and water quality problems were 
perceived to be increasingly acute (Berry 1982; Lovei and Whittington 1993; Gilbert and James 
1994, Indonesia Times, 1996). One response (in Jakarta as in other Indonesian cities) was limited 
private sector participation: out-sourcing of routine repairs, billing and payment collection by 
Jakarta’s water supply utility, PAM Jaya (Mandaung 2001). Water supply was one of many PSP 
initiatives ongoing in the country; the Indonesian government had passed legislation enabling private 
sector participation and privatisation for most public sector utilities in the mid-1990s, and had 
embarked on private ventures in various sectors over the past decade, such as privately funded toll 
highways throughout the greater Jakarta area
40. Over the 1990s, at both the municipal and national 
scale, the Indonesian state increasingly solicited private sector investment in, and management of 
key public utility sectors (Robison 1997, Robison and Hadiz 1993, 2004). 
 
Discussions regarding a long-term PSP concession contract with foreign firms began in the mid-
1990s. International water companies were keenly interested in entering the water services market 
in Indonesia, as a large, middle-income country with an expanding middle class with relatively low 
penetration of networked water supply services. After protracted negotiations, ‘cooperation 
agreements’ for the management and expansion of Jakarta’s water supply system were awarded in 
late 1997 to two of the largest water services companies in the world
41: (British) Thames Water 
International and (French) Ondeo (Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux). The process of awarding the contract 
for Jakarta’s water supply was characterized by what the political science literature defines as 
                                                 
39 Three sources of data were used: data collected through a household survey of poor households in six Jakarta 
neighbourhoods in 2005; data provided by the two private concessionaires and the Jakarta municipal government; and 
interviews with water supply managers, government officials, and NGO representatives in 2001 and 2005. 
40 Private sector participation contracts in water supply have been signed in several other Indonesian cities: Bali; Batam; 
Medan; Lhok Seumawe; Sidoarjo; and Pekanbaru (Baye 1997; ADB 2003). 
41 Sanitation services were not included in the contract, and remain the responsibility of the various municipalities that make 
up the greater Jakarta area.  ‘collusive corruption’ (where government and private sector officials collude to deprive the 
government of revenues) (Bardhan 1997, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). This occurred rather than a 
public tendering process, where international water companies put forward unsolicited proposals 
directly to the government. Under then-President Suharto, partnership with an Indonesian firm was 
a prerequisite for international corporations hoping to take over the operations of a utility network. 
This is not unusual in the international water supply sector, in which private sector consortia 
typically have local minority shareholders. In the case of Indonesia, however, these private sector 
consortia were frequently linked directly to the President; by the early 1990s the large Indonesian 
conglomerates had “already [become] active within other public service areas, and these groups 
expected to benefit from the privatization of water services” (Baye 1997, 201).  
 
The two international firms were partnered with two local private firms, respectively members of 
two of the most important conglomerates in Indonesia – Salim Group (run by Bob Hassan, a crony of 
then-President Suharto) and Sigit Group (run by Sigit Harjojudanto, Suharto’s eldest son)
 42. In 
January 1998, each consortium signed a 25-year contract with PAM Jaya, the municipal water 
supplier in Jakarta, which retained ownership of the water supply assets. The private consortia 
were to be responsible for operation of the water supply system, including administration of the 
customer database and billing. Thames’ contract allocated the company the exclusive right to 
operate and manage the existing water supply system in the eastern half of the city
43, supplying 2 
million people connected to the supply system out of a potential customer base of 5 million. 
Simultaneously, Lyonnaise des Eaux was given a contract to supply the western half of the city (Map 
6), covering a slightly larger number of potential customers. Ambitious targets were set: the 
private companies committed to reaching universal coverage by 2023 and to supply potable water to 
consumer by 2007. 
 
The contracts were expected to be lucrative for both the local and international partners. Under 
the terms of the contract, this profit was not to be linked directly to the revenues of the municipal 
water supply system. Instead, each consortium was to receive a fee on the basis of volume of water 
supplied and billed, not on the basis of the water tariff (set by the municipality), or the percentage 
of cost recovery. With no direct equity stake, and with profit de-linked from cost-recovery rates, 
the international water companies thus sought to minimise the risk inherent in cost-recovery. An 
additional safeguard was built into the payment mechanism: an indexation formula, linked to the 
rupiah-US dollar exchange rate and the (Indonesian) inflation rate  was built into the ‘water charge’ 
formula used to determine payments made to the private operators – who are paid according to unit 
volume of water delivered to the distribution network rather than billing revenue. Cost recovery 
and currency risks, in other words, were to be borne by the local government. 
 
                                                 
42 Corruption in Indonesia is internationally recognized as being particularly pervasive (Transparency International).  
‘Market consumption’ and ‘parochial consumption’ (where the latter hinges on kinship, caste, etc. and the former on wealth) 
(Scott 1969) were conflated in a system that came to be known in Indonesia by the triad of ‘Corruption Collusion Nepotism’ 
popularized as an acronym (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme or KKN) which came to symbolize the Soeharto regime (Robertson-
Snape 1999). That the contracts were awarded despite national laws prohibiting foreign investment in drinking water 
delivery (Law No. 1/1967; Ministry of Home Affairs Decision No. 3/1990) and local regulations (No. 11/1992 and No. 11/1993) 
precluding private sector involvement in community drinking water supply was to be a source of conflict in the early years of 
the contract (Argo and Firman 2001).  
43 Indonesia Times (1998) “Privatised water supply begins soon” January 16
th, p. 3.  4b. Re-regulation: Tariffs, profits, and the re-negotiation of the contract 
 
The political and economic turmoil that unfolded in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998 vitiated these 
strategies. Riots, the resignation of Suharto, and the abrupt and dramatic devaluation of the 
Indonesian rupiah
44 threw the country into a period of chaos. After a tense interlude in which 
senior expatriate managers of the private concessionaires fled the country, local managers 
cancelled the PSP contracts, and senior British and French executives and diplomats pressured the 
federal government to have the contracts reinstated, the private concessionaires resumed 
operations (having discreetly abandoned their Indonesian partners, now tainted by their association 
with ex-President Suharto) (Harsono 2005).  
 
Confronted with public protest over rising prices of staple food items and gasoline, the municipal 
government refused to raise tariffs to compensate for the devaluation of the rupiah. This delay in 
tariff increases should not, in theory, have posed difficulties for the private water companies, as 
revenues are determined by a ‘water charge’ paid per unit volume of water delivered into the 
network. This means that revenue of the private operators is not linked to amounts billed or 
collected from consumers. In other words, the revenue of the private concessionaires is, in theory, 
independent of cost-recovery as well as tariffs. Indexing the water charge to the Rupiah-USD 
exchange rate provided protection against currency devaluation; should the rupiah fall in value, the 
water charge (expressed in rupiah), would rise accordingly.  
 
The limitations of this strategy were revealed when receipts in dollar terms plummeted from 1998 
onwards. Given political unrest in Jakarta, the Governor was unwilling to implement agreed-upon 
tariff increases. The gap between the water charge required for compensating the private 
companies and the average water tariff increased dramatically. Whereas, the water charge paid to 
the private operators was 11% below the average tariff in 1997, it rose to over 60% above the 
average tariff in early 2001 (Figure 5). Subsequent tariff increases did not raise the tariff above 
the water charge until early 2004 (Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body 2004). The result was 
that the amount charged by the private concessionaires – via the water charge – to the government 
increased dramatically, while revenue fell just as dramatically. PAM Jaya (and thus the local 
government) bore the sole risk for the revenue shortfall, and became increasingly indebted to the 
private companies. The cumulative deficit by the end of 2001 was Rp 469 billion (approximately $46 
million USD) and had reached Rp 990 billion (approximately $97 million USD) by September 2003 -- 
excluding late payment interest and retroactive tariff increases (Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory 
Body 2005).  
 
The time period for repayment of this debt by PAM Jaya is likely to be protracted. With the fall in 
the value of the rupiah, its operating revenues fell approximately four-fold in dollar terms. PAM 
Jaya’s revenue can be expected to be on the order of 400 billion rupiah per year (approximately 
one-twentieth of the outstanding ‘debt’); the negotiated tariff increases are likely to be less than 
10% per year. Thus, although tariffs were raised and will continue to increase, these increases will 
not generate sufficient revenue to quickly repay the ‘shortfall’.  
 
                                                 
44 From 2,396 Rupiah/US$ in February 1997 to 9500 Rupiah/ US$ on February 2
nd 1998 (Robison and Rosser 1998).  This shortfall, as well as ongoing labour disputes and disagreements about tariff increases, resulted 
in a standoff between the private concessionaires and PAM Jaya in 2001 and 2002. After Suharto’s 
departure from power, a ‘restated’ contract had been signed in 2001, allowing for regular tariff 
increases and also substantially reallocating risks between the public sector and private 
concessionaires. In essence, the concession contract was transformed it into a management 
contract - with a guaranteed internal rate of return of 22% - rather than the original concession 
agreement
45 (Global Water Report 2002). The result of discussions between PAM Jaya, the private 
operators, and the local government was an informal renegotiation of the contract to create two-
year ‘interim arrangement’ whereby the operating expenditures of the concessionaires are made 
available to the rump water company and the regulator for evaluation (Global Water Report 2002). 
Under the earlier concession contract, this information would not have been made available. 
However, concerns about the disparity between the water charge and the average tariff, and 
suspicions on the part of PAM Jaya and the municipality that the private operators were inflating 
operating expenditure in order to reduce their apparent profit levels, led to the demand for the 
private operators to open their books. Operating expenditure was re-evaluated, and additional 
information gathered in studies by PAM Jaya and the regulator (the Jakarta Water Supply 
Regulatory Body) was used to assist with retroactive restructuring of water tariffs from January 
2003. Technical targets have been dramatically scaled back (Table 4); most notably, target 
coverage ratios have been reduced, and the commitment to provide potable water supply at the 
point of consumption was dropped
46.  
 
The failure to negotiate a mutually acceptable schedule for raising tariffs led to a standoff 
between PAM Jaya and private concessionaires in 2003 and 2004. After two years of difficult 
negotiations, a new contract was signed with one of the two private concessionaires in December 
2004 (Palyja, for western Jakarta); at the time of writing, a new contract had not yet been signed 
with the other concessionaire (TPJ, in eastern Jakarta). Poor design of the original contract, weak 
regulatory capacity (exacerbated by the failure to create an independent regulatory authority at 
the outset of the contract), and inappropriate design of incentives for tariff policy have been key 
contributing factors. The implications for poor urban residents are potentially significant, insofar 
as protracted and at times acrimonious contract negotiations divert regulatory and management 
attention from network management and expansion, and insofar as major investment decisions are 
delayed. 
  
The absence of an independent regulatory body in the first years of the contract was of critical 
importance to the breakdown in negotiations between the private sector concessionaires and the 
government. Originally, the rump public water company (Pam Jaya) was designated as the regulator 
of the private concessionaires. In addition to the potential conflict of interest raised when 
employees transfer back and forth between the operators and the regulator, this model raises 
more fundamental issues of capacity, funding, and independence. The lack of a sufficiently clear 
executive/legislative distinction, mistrust of power-sharing between different levels of 
government, and desire to maintain control over a basic and potentially politically controversial 
resource are some of the reasons behind the original decision. The resulting regulatory structure 
was an important factor in the breakdown of the original contract. 
                                                 
45 As with many such contracts, profits are ‘backloaded’. The Internal Rate of Return is calculated over the lifetime of the 
contract, and is, to date, negative. 
46 A. Anwar, Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body, personal communication (interview) 12 May 2005.  
A formally independent regulatory body – the Jakarta Water Regulatory Board - was only created in 
2001, four years after the signing of the contract
47. There are 5 members of the Regulatory 
Board: the Chairman, and four board members representing four distinct areas of expertise: 
technical,  financial, legal and consumer. The Board has a relatively small staff (8 professional staff 
and office staff), and relies heavily on outsourcing expertise for its activities. Its budget is 
approximately 4 billion rupiah per year (approx 400,000 USD); these funds come from the revenues 
paid by consumers.  Its mandate is to monitor and regulate policies and tariffs at the macro level, 
and to mediate between the parties to the contract. In addition, some regulatory roles have 
remained with PAM Jaya, which monitors the performance of the private sector concessionaires at 
a micro-level and has approximately 150 staff. A key weakness with the regulatory framework is 
that the Governor’s decree creating the Regulatory Board does not specify the division of labour 
between PAM Jaya and the Board. Moreover, neither body is charged with strategic analysis for 
long-term policy for water resources and supply for the city and region as a whole. 
 
Moreover, the new, independent Regulatory Body has only limited powers; much of its activities 
consist of technical assessments, on the basis of which it advises the Governor of DKI Jakarta on 
preferred levels and timing of tariff increases. The purely advisory role played by the Regulatory 
Body limits its effectiveness and allows political considerations to continue to influence tariff policy 
decision-making. Moreover, the Regulatory Body has devoted a substantial amount of attention to 
adjudicating the ongoing dispute between the concessionaires and the Jakarta government 
regarding contract renegotiations and retroactive restructuring of water tariffs. Accordingly, 
relatively few resources have been available for broader policy activities or coordination with other 
regulators or bodies working on water. This is important, given that responsibility for water issues 
remains fragmented between various departments at the state and federal level; no government 
agency coordinates the important decisions on issues affecting water resources and supply 
development (e.g. on land-use). More generally, the lack of a stable and transparent regulatory 
framework has hindered the ability of both the government, the private concessionaires, and the 
regulators to determine roles and responsibilities with clarity. Accordingly, key issues (such as long-
term strategic planning for water resources development) are not being comprehensively addressed. 
 
4c. Private sector participation and the pro-poor debate: Connecting the poor? 
 
Implicit in the original technical target of 100% service coverage, and explicit in public 
justifications of the PSP contracts, was the belief that private sector participation in water supply 
would lead to a higher rate of connection of poor households. Service coverage has increased since 
1998, but the distribution of new connections has not been ‘pro-poor’, if this is defined as a rate of 
connection equal or greater to the percentage of poor in the urban population. 
 
An important goal of the original concession agreement was the extension of the network and 
increase in coverage, for which targets were specified in the original contracts. By 2002, however, 
service coverage level for two concession areas remained just above to 50%, well below the 70% 
target specified for 2002 in the initial contract (Global Water Report 2002) (Table 4). New 
                                                 
47 Interview with Alizar Anwar, advisor to the Regulatory Board, May 2005. connections have occurred, but these have not targeted poor customers in proportion to their 
representation in the urban population (Table 5). Figure 3 illustrates the disproportionate 
weighting of consumer connections in middle-income tariff bands in 2003; whereas the majority of 
residents in Jakarta would fall into the ‘lower middle’ and ‘low income’ categories, 87% of networked 
connections are provided to tariffs for middle-income households or above. This is, to some extent, 
the legacy of public sector management, attributable to unwillingness by the municipally managed 
utility to extend the network into poor areas due to fears about low cost recovery (Taylor 1983), 
and to a tariff pricing policy in which water rates for public hydrants (used by poor households and 
water vendors) were higher per unit volume than water rates for individual households – implying a 
reduction in revenue when a poor household was connected to the network (Crane 1994). 
 
This legacy of the public sector under-provisions of individual household connections to poor 
customers was not, however, redressed by the private concessionaires. Table 3 provides data on 
the numbers of new consumers connected in each tariff band by one of the two private 
concessionaries (Thames PAM Jaya) over the period 1998 to 2004. Only 25% of new connections 
were targeted in the two lowest tariff bands (public hydrants, intended to serve those without 
household connections; and ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ households). In other words, three quarters of new 
connections were for middle-income and upper-income households, government enterprises and 
commercial enterprises.  
 
Given that the private concessionaires are paid via a ‘water charge’, which is linked to volumes of 
water delivered into the water supply system but is independent of revenues and tariffs, this bias 
towards wealthier consumers might seem surprising. There is no apparent direct disincentive to the 
private concessionaires to connect low-income households. Why, then, were customers in the lowest 
tariff bands less likely to be connected? An important part of the explanation lies in the pricing 
levels of the tariff bands (Table 3). The lowest tariff (May 2005 data) is 550 Rupiah/m3, well 
below the production cost (of approximately 3000 m3)
48. Increasing the number of connections in 
the lowest tariff band thus decreases the average revenue per cubic metre supplied. Reducing the 
average revenue per cubic metre by connecting poor households would lower the municipality’s 
revenues, in turn reducing their ability to pay the water charge, and to repay the debt shortfall 
owed to the private operators.  
 
A secondary disincentive is the higher average cost per connection in poor neighbourhoods, which 
raises installation costs: given the lack of land-use planning in informal settlements, the highly 
dense and disordered distribution of homes means that installing connections may be more time-
consuming (if conventional below-ground infrastructure is used). 
 
The municipality thus has two direct incentives not to target poorer neighbourhoods for new 
connections. This is an important explanation for why the utility, when under public management, did 
not connect poor customers. In turn, this produces an indirect disincentive for the private 
operators to connect poor customers: the revenue received by the municipality is the source of 
funds from which the private operators are paid, and decreasing revenues implies a greater chance 
of debt, longer repayment period, and increased possibility of municipal default. 
 
                                                 
48 Interview with Alizar Anwar, Advisor to the Jakarta Regulatory Body, May 2005. The perverse disincentives built into Jakarta’s water supply tariff structure are an example of how 
pricing strategies intended to increase access have counterproductive goals (Whittington 1992). 
The remedy, as most commonly prescribed by international financial institutions, is to increase 
tariffs (a seemingly counterintuitive strategy), thereby removing the disincentive for connecting 
poor consumers and providing more capital to finance new connections (e.g. Azdan 2001; Yepes 
1999). This recommendation is supported by studies, which assert that ‘willingness-to-pay’ and 
‘ability-to-pay’ of poor customers is higher than previously thought. Frequently, the higher rates 
per unit volume paid by poor customers relying on water vendors are cited as evidence for this 
argument (e.g. Soto Montes de Oca et al 2003; Winpenny 1994). Indeed, the response to the 
problem of low tariffs in Jakarta has been a series of negotiated tariff increases, which have 
disproportionately raised tariffs for poorer and middle income groups (Table 3).  
 
The above argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, it overlooks the fact that water 
customers are ‘price takers’ rather than ‘price makers’. Water vendors typically operate as spatial 
monopolists; in Jakarta, vendors do not compete, but rather collude to establish monopoly supply 
zones and a captive clientele (Susantono 2001). Information about willingness-to-pay can not be 
extracted, I would argue, in this context – particularly where lack of surface or ground water 
availability in urban neighbourhoods makes water vendors the only source of water (apart from 
bottled water, which are even more expensive per unit volume).  
 
Second, this argument overlooks the fact that monopolistic control of water vending creates a 
political barrier to network expansion to the poor. Water vending is controlled by a complex 
network of middlemen running tankers, ambulatory water vendors and public standpipes connected 
to PAM Jaya’s network (Lovei and Whittington 1993). The monopoly rent extracted from the cities’ 
poor represents an attractive source of profits. Indeed, the potential profitability of extracting 
rent from the captive market of water consumers is recognized through the practice of selling 
informal ‘licenses’ amongst water vendors (Susantono 2001). In Jakarta, as in other cities, this 
monopolistic behaviour is sometimes linked with organized crime, and at times characterized by 
intimidation (if not outright violence) of customers, competing vendors, and police and city officials 
who attempt to eradicate informal water vending practices (e.g. Swyngedouw 1997). To put it 
crudely, mafia-like control of water vending in poor areas of the city is a significant barrier to 
network expansion, which an increase in tariffs will not address. This is significant, as surveys have 
found that approximately one third of Jakarta’s households purchase water from street vendors 
(World Bank 1993; Crane and Daniere 1996, 1997; and survey by author in June/July 2005) (Table 
2). This implies that solutions to the problem of water supply in Jakarta must also address issues of 
governance – particularly in the context of an approach to state power and urban planning in Jakarta 
in which state activities are often geared towards the reaffirmation of prestige and reinforcement 
of networks of patronage, rather than public welfare per se (Cowherd 2002; Kusno 1998, 2000). 
 
A third critique of the ‘raise prices to improve access to the poor’ argument arises in situations 
where, as in Jakarta, other attractive sources of water are readily available. The existence of 
shallow and deep aquifers in the city means that groundwater is a viable alternative to networked 
water, for both wealthy residents (who rely on cleaner, but more expensive deep wells) and poor 
residents (who rely on shallow wells, often contaminated by urban runoff and saline due to seawater 
intrusion). Reliance on groundwater as one of multiple sources of water is common in poor areas of 
the city (Table 2); however, depletion of groundwater has led to salinisation in some areas, rendering water unfit for drinking and cooking (Braadbaart and Braadbaart 1997). Reliability (in 
contrast to low pressure and intermittent flow in the networked water supply system), low cost, and 
quality are important factors determining consumer preferences for groundwater. Groundwater and 
wells in the city are regulated by the national government’s Ministry of Mines, which has no formal 
mandate to cooperate with municipal water suppliers; this has meant that initial plans by the private 
concessionaires to prohibit users from accessing private wells have not been implemented.  Raising 
networked water prices may lead, in the absence of governance reform and networked water quality 
improvements to groundwater ‘crowding out’ networked water supply, and to a further reduction in 
revenues. Indeed, water managers for the two private companies have noted, with some 
consternation, the growing number of ‘zero consumption’ customers – some of whom may be 
switching to other water sources. 
 
This, in turn, raises a more general point about water pricing, pertaining to the limits of cross-
subsidisation within a water-pricing regime in cities, such as Jakarta, with a large proportion of 
poor residents. With a ratio of domestic to industrial customers of 80/20 and with relatively few 
users in higher tariff bands, possibilities for cross-subsidies in Jakarta are relatively limited. This 
suggests that in the absence of subsidies external to the water supply pricing regime -- as are used 
in Chile, and were used in OECD countries such as the UK (Bakker 2004; Gomez-Lobo 2001) -- 
raising tariffs will not necessarily have the desired goal of increasing revenues and increasing rates 
of connection of the poor. As discussed in the following section, additional measures to reduce or 
remove disincentives for poor customers to choose network connections will also be required. 
 
4d. Pro-poor initiatives by the private sector 
 
Recognizing some of these barriers to connecting the poor, both private concessionaires have 
undertaken limited initiatives to improve access for poorer households. To render in-house 
connections more affordable, Palyja introduced a policy allowing poorer households (on the lowest 
tariff bands) to pay the connection fee in 12 monthly instalments included in the monthly water 
bill
49. Partly as a result, in West Jakarta, the number of poor people served increased from 72,816 
in February 1998 to 177,164 in December 2000 (ADB 2003a), but the monthly bills remain at a level 
above what many households can afford.  
 
In the eastern concession area, the community of Marunda was targeted by TPJ, which used a grant 
(of approximately 60,000 GBP (approximately $100,000 USD) from its British parent company to 
subsidize the provision of in-house connections. Over the five years of the contract, 1,600 
households were connected. To facilitate payment, connection fees were waived and households 
were instead required to pay a deposit (of approximately US $2.50) (ADB 2003a). Levels of water 
consumption have reportedly increased dramatically, while water bills have fallen substantially (ADB 
2003a). Prior to the concession contract, households in Marunda District generally received their 
water from private vendors who purchased water from tankers. Households used to spend, on 
average, US$7.50 a month for 3 m
3 of water (five 20-litre containers of water at $0.05 a 
container) now pay approximately $1.125 for 30 m
3 of water (at $0.0375 per m
3 –most customers 
being on a low tariff, reflecting the small size of their dwellings), consuming 10 times as much water 
                                                 
49 The pro-rated monthly connection fee of $0.71 included in the monthly water bill. A household consuming 20 m
3 a month 
will thus have a monthly bill of about $1.50 ($0.0375 x 20 + $0.71).  but paying approximately one-seventh of their previous monthly bills, partly the reason for high 
levels of cost recovery from the newly connected households (BPD 2003). Recognizing the limited 
penetration of water supply network into poor neighbourhoods, the federal government launched a 
water supply program in some of the poorest kampungs in 2004
50, but the provision of household 
connections was severely limited by the disincentives discussed above, compounded by an 
unwillingness of private partners to extend the network in conjunction with the government, and by 
suspicion on the part of some public sector managers that publicly-provided infrastructure would 
end up providing implicit subsidies to the private sector (Shofiani 2005). 
 
Given the high level of indebtedness of the municipal water utility to the private concessionaires, 
little interest has been shown on the part of the private companies in extending what are 
essentially charitable, loss-making initiatives. Accordingly, these ‘pro-poor’ initiatives have remained 
limited in scope, and have not been duplicated elsewhere in the city. Without an explicit ‘pro-poor’ 
policy on the part of the Government, and in the absence of specific pro-poor targets in the 
contract, new connections in poorer areas are likely to lag in proportion to the overall increase in 
new connections for the reasons discussed above. Recognizing this, donors have begun re-funding 
community water supply in Jakarta. The (American bilateral aid donor) USAID, through its 
Environmental Services Program (with a budget of $40 million USD over five years) is funding 
small-scale community water supply systems in West Java, including Jakarta; these community 
systems will include alternative water supply technologies (such as wells) and will not necessarily 
connect users to the network. In both cases, USAID-ESP intends to initiate alternative water 
governance mechanisms, whereby a currently unconnected community would get access to a main 
pipeline, and a community based organization would then facilitate ‘group access’ to a network 
connection, thereby reducing the costs of networked water supply by sharing fixed charges 
(including connection fees and meter rental charges). The second major project being brought on 
line by donors is the World Bank’s $5 million US ‘output based aid’ project for expanding network 
coverage in Jakarta
51. Funded by the UK’s bilateral aid agency, DfID, the project provides cheap 
capital to the two concessionaires to connect the poor
52. UK-based NGOs have been highly critical 
of DfID’s funding of private sector activity in the water sector, allegedly linking it to British 
government support for British water companies operating abroad (WDM 2005). 
 
Output-based aid is an increasingly important part of the World Bank’s approach to private sector 
development, which delegates service delivery to non-governmental third parties (non-profit or for-
profit private sector, or public sector agencies operating on a ‘commercial’ basis)  under contracts 
that tie payments to the outputs or results actually delivered to target beneficiaries. Such 
performance-based subsidies are justified, according to the World Bank’s Rapid Response Unit 
(which focuses on fostering private sector involvement in development) where policy concerns, such 
as the affordability for particular groups of users, justify public funding to complement or replace 
                                                 
50 Under the auspices of the Kimpraswil Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation program, created to offset the impacts of a 
reduction in fuel subsidies on poor households.  
51 At the time of writing (October 2005), the USAID project was underway and the World Bank project was in the tendering 
stage. 
52 This approach has been used for water connections for the poor in Cambodia and Paraguay. In 2003, DFID and the World 
Bank established the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World 
Bank. user fees. Results are defined in specific terms: for example, the number of children immunized, or 
the number of operational electricity or water connections. 
 
This, in turn, raises questions about the long-term ability of PSP contracts to supply water to the 
poor. Similar questions were raised in the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure report
53 
released at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003. The panel articulated the need for a 
new financial architecture to stimulate and support flows of private capital for water and sanitation 
(Winpenny 2003) including, controversial calls to use official aid funding to support private sector 
involvement through the provision of low-cost finance and risk mitigation mechanisms such as 
currency guarantees for private investors in developing countries
54. Implementing the pro-poor 
approach in this way would entail a potentially dramatic transformation in the premises and 
mechanisms of official ODA finance, in which public funds are provided to subsidize poorer 
households, enabling private sector operators to manage water supply systems at a profit. 
Ironically, one of the key promises by advocates of PSP contracts has been the independent 
financing that private companies could provide under some types of PSP agreements.  In contrast to 
these promises, some private water companies have more recently argued that they must have 
access to public funds, on concessionary terms (from governments, bilateral aid agencies, or 
multilateral developments banks) if they are to meet universal service coverage targets. 
 
Simultaneously, private companies are under pressure to perform from consumers and the new 
regulatory body (the Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body), which has gradually been given 
increased oversight powers since its inception in 2001. Customer complaints have increased 
dramatically, according to the Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI)
55. A successful class action 
law suit brought by a consumer’s organization (KOMPARTA - the Jakarta Water Consumers 
Community) against the private companies for raising tariffs by 40% in 2003 without concomitant 
improvements in performance is indicative of greater willingness by consumers organizations to use 
litigation where government regulation has proven to be ineffective, reflective of a broader trend 
across Indonesia following the end of the New Order era (Hadiz and Dhakidal 2005, Heryonto and 
Mandal 2003). 
 
4e Rethinking private sector involvement? 
 
The Jakarta case illustrates the difficulties faced by private companies in extending supply 
networks to poorer areas. Implicit in the arguments in favour of PSP during the early phase of the 
debate was the assumption that the benefits of improved water supply would ‘trickle down’ to the 
                                                 
53 Commissioned by the organizers of the Third World Water Forum, and chaired by former IMF General Manager Michel 
Camdessus, the Panel brought together the Presidents of major multilateral development banks (IADB, ADB, EBRD, WB), and 
representatives of the IFC, Citibank, US Ex-Im Bank, private water companies (Suez, Thames Water), government 
representatives (from Mexico, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Egypt, and France) and two NGOs (Transparency International and 
WaterAid). 
54 These proposals, as well as the composition of the Panel and the lack of public consultation on the report have been 
critiqued by a number of organizations, which have raised numerous points: the focus on large-scale infrastructure and lack 
of emphasis on alternative technologies, levels of service, governance models, citizen input, and methods of improving public 
sector performance; the focus on encouraging private sector involvement to the exclusion of other business models; and the 
ethics and feasibility of providing risk mitigation and cost reduction to the private sector via the use of public funds (Bakker 
2003b).  
55 Personal communication, Indah Sukmanisingh, Director, YLKI, 13 May 2005. poor. Accordingly, relatively few contracts contained detailed ‘pro-poor’ elements such as subsidy 
mechanisms, below-marginal cost tariffs, or explicit cooperation with and mobilization of the 
multitude of NGOs frequently already operating in larger urban centres in the South (ADB 2003a). 
Indeed, the logic of ‘full cost recovery’ implicit in the commercialization of services – in which 
consumers pay the full cost, with no cross subsidies – runs counter to the principles upon which 
utility services were provided throughout much of the twentieth century, particularly in the North, 
where cross subsidies between classes of consumer and subsidies from central government to local 
governments responsible for water services were widespread (Bakker 2004). State provision of 
water supply, together with cross-subsidies between classes of consumers, was initiated in many 
areas to address the low ability-to-pay of many consumers, while providing all citizens with a 
necessity so basic to social life that affordable water supply became understood in many countries 
as a material emblem of citizenship.  
 
Private sector providers have rediscovered this 19
th century lesson – that extending water supply to 
informal settlements of largely poor consumers in rapidly expanding urban areas, often in the 
context of an absence of tenure systems and rent-seeking on the part of local elites, is fraught 
with difficulty (Bakker 2003a). The promise of private sector delivery is seductive: “private 
participation in infrastructure can help poor people by tapping private initiative to extend access to 
basic infrastructure and reduce costs…[for example] where modern water systems extend service 
to additional poor customers, typically in peri-urban areas, prices paid by poor people drop 
precipitously by factors of ten or more, as poor people are no longer dependent on expensive 
private water vendors” (World Bank 2002, 13). In the first wave of PSP contracts, however, private 
companies found that they were less able than promised (as signified by targets agreed to in 
contracts) to extend supply into poor neighbourhoods – due to low ability to pay, low profitability, 
and poor fit between the payment demands of formal systems (large, relatively infrequent 
payments, backed up by security in the form of land/property tenure) and the household economy 
of the poor (intermittent access to smaller amounts of cash – often living in situations without 
secure tenure). The ensuing failure of many PSP contracts to extend water supply to poor areas 
over the past decade has in some cases led to cancellation and/or renegotiation of contracts – 
bringing the logic of commercialization into question. The ‘pro-poor’ issue has thus become 
increasingly central to the debate over whether the private sector should be involved in supplying 
water, and in public services and ‘development’ more generally. 
 5: Searching for Solutions: Contemporary water law and water governance in Indonesia (1000) 
 
5a: The debate over water sector reform 
 
 
The water sector in numerous countries has been undergoing significant change over the past 
decade. These reforms can be characterized as a shift towards a ‘new water paradigm’ (Gleick 
2000a), which prioritizes demand management (‘non-structural’) rather than traditional supply side 
(infrastructure-intensive) management (Lacey 2004), treats water as an economic good (Winpenny 
1994; Rogers, de Silva et al. 2002), seeks to address basic ecological as well as human needs, and 
entails broad-based changes to water governance, including involving stakeholders to a greater 
degree than in the past (Cesano and Gustafsson 2000; Gleick 2000a; Saleth and Dinar 2000, 2005). 
Water reforms have occurred in both the North and South, but vary in emphasis. In the global 
South, private sector participation in water supply in urban areas has increased dramatically over 
the past two decades, and the irrigation sector has been the target of pricing and market reforms 
in rural areas; in the global North, in addition, ecological restoration and water quality amelioration 
have been given greater priority ( Bakker 2003a; Huffaker and Whittlesey 2003; Kijne 2001; 
Kloezen 1998; Kumar and Singh 2001; Landry 1998; Takahashi 2001; Ward and Michelsen 2002). 
 
These changes have generated debates about the socio-economic identity of water: is water a 
‘commons’ or a ‘commodity’? At the risk of over-simplification, the commodity view asserts that 
private ownership and management of water supply systems (in distinction from water itself) is 
possible and indeed preferable. From this perspective, water is no different than other essential 
goods and utility services. Private companies, who will be responsive both to customers and to 
shareholders, can efficiently run and profitably manage water supply systems. Water conservation 
will be incentivized through pricing – users will cease wasteful behaviour as water prices rise with 
increasing scarcity. Proponents of the ‘commodity’ view assert that water must be treated as an 
economic good, as specified in the Dublin principles and in the Hague Declaration
56. 
 
In contrast, the commons view of water asserts its unique qualities: water is a resource essential 
for life, the conversion of which into a business opportunity is unethical. From this perspective, 
collective management – whether by communities or the state – is not only preferable but also 
necessary; private ownership of water supply will, it is argued, invariably conflict with the public 
interest. Those who advance the ‘commons’ view assert that conservation is more effectively 
incentivized through an environmental, collectivist ethic of solidarity, which will encourage users to 
refrain from wasteful behaviour. The real ‘water crisis’ arises from socially produced scarcity, in 
which a short-term logic of economic growth, twinned with the rise of corporate power (and in 
particular water multi-nationals) has ‘converted abundance into scarcity’.  As a response to the 
Hague Declaration, the P7 Declaration (2000) outlined principles ‘water democracy’, of 
decentralized, community-based, democratic water management in which water conservation is 
politically, socio-economically and culturally inspired rather than economically motivated. Central to 
these critiques of the ‘new water paradigm’ is the view that water is a basic human right (Gleick 
2000b, Morgan 2004). 
                                                 
56 The Ministerial Declaration of the Hague on Water Security in the 21
st century followed the inter-ministerial meeting 
known as the ‘2
nd World Water Forum’ in 2000. See www.worldwaterforum.net.  
 
5b Debates over water supply sector reform in Indonesia 
 
The debates explored in the preceding section are ongoing in Indonesia
57.  International financial 
institutions argue that one of the most important factors contributing to low levels of water 
services provision in Jakarta is the low levels of infrastructure finance (see, for example, Akhtar 
2005; World Bank 2004), exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis and currency devaluation. 
Initiatives such as the Indonesia Infrastructure Summit (held in Jakarta in early 2005) have 
explicitly targeted foreign direct investment. The government has identified a significant shortfall 
in financing requirements for rehabilitation and extension of urban infrastructure. Promotion of 
water sector reform by multilateral financial institutions has targeted changes that could enable 
greater non-domestic and private financing of the water sector. 
  
A second focus of the reforms is water governance. Jurisdictional fragmentation has reduced the 
ability of any one level of government in Jakarta to effectively govern water resources within a 
watershed, or even within urban boundaries
58. Municipal governance structures are particularly 
weak. In Jakarta (as with other cities in Indonesia and indeed around the world), water utility 
budgets were not ring-fenced from that of the municipality. Rather, a small tax base and presence 
of few alternative revenue-generating activities for the municipal government encouraged the use 
of water utility revenues for non-water related expenditure by municipal politicians and managers. 
For many water supply utilities in Indonesia, this had the effect of reducing the amount of 
revenues available to cover operating costs and fund capital expenditure (notably infrastructure 
rehabilitation and improvement), exacerbated by relatively low cost recovery rates. Like water 
supply utilities across the South, Indonesian water providers are often caught in a vicious cycle: low 
cost recovery, low revenue, low investment, and low levels of service (Bakker 2003a; Cross and 
Morel 2005; Nunan and Satterthwaite 2001).  
 
In summary, a shortage of finance and weak governance have been identified by IFIs as two key 
reasons for the poor performance of the water supply sector in Indonesia. The result, as in many 
other countries, has been a twinned response: the support of private sector participation in the 
water supply sector in the hopes of attracting increased private investment, including an ADB 
technical assistance grant supporting private sector participation in the water sector (ADB 2005); 
and broad-based market-oriented water sector reform, including a controversial new Water Law 
passed in 2004 (No. 7/2004), which decentralized management of water resources, established 
                                                 
57 Debates over water sector reform also pertain to water resources, irrigation, and rural areas. The discussion in this 
section is constrained to municipal water supply in urban areas. 
58 In the Jakarta region, for example, the majority of the JMA is a politically constituted as an independent territory with a 
status of a province – ‘DKI Jakarta’ (Special Capital Region of Jakarta). The city governor is independent from West Java 
province, and (together with the municipal government) controls the city’s water supply company: PAM Jaya. The province of 
West Java is responsible for the urban areas which fall outside of DKI Jakarta, and for the watershed in which the main 
Jatiluhur reservoir for Jakarta’s water supply is sited (well upstream from the city). Environmental and urban planning 
regulations are not systematically applied within the watershed, and the open canals which act as conduits for Jatiluhur 
water are polluted by residential and industrial effluent, posing serious water quality challenges to the municipal water 
supply utility engineers. Meanwhile, within the city, tackling groundwater pollution from effluent within the city is 
complicated by the division of responsibility amongst the sewerage authority, the municipal water utility (which controls 
networked water supply), and the national government’s Ministry of Mines, which bears responsibility for regulating deep (i.e. 
drilled) wells, from which a substantial proportion of the city’s residents draw water. (potential) tradable water rights and redefined water as an economic good (Jakarta Post 2003; 
World Bank 1999a, 2004b, 2005). These developments are in line with the evolution of governance 
frameworks internationally over the past two decades, in which state authority has been 
increasingly delegated to non-state (usually private sector) actors (Pierre 1995, 2000; Rogers and 
Hall 2003), characteristic of neoliberal framings of solutions to environmental problems (for recent 
critiques relevant to water, see Bakker 2005; Goldman 2005; Haughton 2002; McDonald and Ruiters 
2005; Swyngedouw 2005).  
 
The NGO response to water sector reforms in Indonesia has been highly critical. The basis of the 
reforms – conducted as part of a USD $300 Million structural adjustment package agreed between 
the World Bank and the Indonesian government in 1999 (World Bank) – are critiqued as a form of 
‘conditionality’, in which a ‘neoliberal’ package of reforms is enforced on governments in return for 
much-needed funds – exacerbated, in Indonesia’s case, by currency devaluation in 1998 (Grusky 
2001). The NGO campaign has brought together environmental, consumers, anti-globalization, and 
religious groups in an alliance unusual for its diversity.
59 Amongst the concerns articulated by the 
NGO campaign regarding the new Water Law are: 
•  the possibility of increased private sector involvement and a weakened legal regime 
protecting municipal governments in their contractual negotiations with private 
companies (Articles 29 and 46),  
•  overly constrained water quality standards (Article 40),  
•  inter-basin diversions (Article 49), rising prices due to full cost-recovery pricing 
requirements (Article 60),  
•  weakened government oversight arising from decentralization of resource management 
to the watershed level,  
•  privatization of (as opposed to private sector participation in) water supply system 
(Article 46), 
•  participation by non-governmental actors (including the private sector) in resource 
allocation decisions at the local level (leading to the ‘privatization’ of water rights) 
(Articles 40 and 41), and 
•  the absence of robust conservation norms related to broader environmental goals in the 
Law. 
 
On this basis, the NGO campaign launched a Constitutional Court case asking for a judicial review of 
the new Water Law, which was rejected by the Court in 2005 (Hadad 2003; Jakarta Post 2005, 
Siregar 2004, 2005)
60. The World Bank and supporters of the new law maintain that the reforms 
will help to address structural weaknesses in the water sector, through four principal changes that 
will be enabled by the Water Law: 
1.  a structured, transparent institutional framework for water resource 
development and management; 
2.  the organizational and financial framework for river basin management  
                                                 
59 - KRuHA (Koalisi Rakyat untuk Hak atas Air ~ Coalition for Water Rights) was formed in 2002, and is made up of 44 NGOs, 
including WALHI (Indonesia’s leading environmental NGO), the Indonesian Consumers Federation, the Indonesian Forum on 
Globalization (INFOG), the Farmers Initiative for Ecological Literacy and Democracy (FIELD), the Jakarta Water 
Consumers Community (KOMPARTA), and the International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development (INFID).  
60 In an unprecedented move, the Court has allowed the claim to be refiled; the case is still before the Court. 
 3.  a framework for regulatory institutions and implementation instruments for 
regional water quality management; and, 
4.  irrigation management performance and fiscal sustainability through farmer 
organization empowerment for participatory irrigation management (World Bank 
1999b). 
 
As in other countries, these two perspectives offer competing views of the implications of the 
water sector reforms. Both opponents and proponents of the new Water Law argue that reform is 





 6. Conclusions 
 
This report has analyzed the social and spatial differentiation of access to water supply in Jakarta, 
Indonesia. Section 3 explored how poverty is correlated with lack of access to a household 
connection, with the use of alternative water sources, with low levels of water consumption, and 
with spending higher proportions of household income on water supplies. Access has a spatial 
dimension: those lacking access are concentrated in specific districts of the city, and within lower 
income areas in neighbourhoods across the city. This is partly related to the geography of the 
distribution network, which penetrates less into poorer neighbourhoods (or avoids them altogether), 
and which is characterized by low pressure in many poorer parts of the city. Section 2 argued that 
this differentiation of access has deep historical roots. The current lack of access by large areas 
of Jakarta’s ‘kampongs’ is due, in part, to the legacy of segregated colonial water supply systems, 
and deliberate under-investment in the post-colonial period, as policy-makers sought to discourage 
rural-urban migration, and gave low priority to extending water supply access to the urban poor, 
focusing instead on economic development of key sectors, or on an urban redevelopment agenda 
focused on ‘monumental’ infrastructure.  
 
This analysis reminds us that we should be wary of viewing cities such as Jakarta through a 
Northern lens. In Jakarta fragmentation of utility services such as water is due not to the recent 
trends of ‘splintering urbanism’ characteristic of cities in the North (Graham and Marvin 2001), but 
rather to a model of urbanization with roots in the colonial era which produces persistent pattern 
of differentiation of spaces, classes, and races. Moreover, we should closely examine the 
rationalities of those excluded from access to water supply networks. Reinterpreting the relations 
established around water supply, identity, urban space, and agency in the colonial era can also be 
used to inform current analyses of water supply provision in Jakarta. First, social differentiation of 
access was an outcome of particular urban planning and macro-economic goals pursued by municipal 
and national governments, and not merely to an  ‘anti-poor’ bias of the private sector. Moreover, 
urban residents continuing to use more ‘traditional’ and communal forms of supply are perhaps not a 
homogenous entity of ‘the thirsty poor’ waiting to be quenched through formal models – whether 
‘colonial’, ‘modernising’ ‘developmental’ or ‘neoliberal’ -- of networked service provision. 
 
Is private sector management of the formal water supply network a solution? Section 4 of the 
report examined the private sector participation contracts in water supply initiated in 1998, which 
were intended to extend household connections in Jakarta. The private sector participation 
contract signed in 1998 with two international operators promised to improve water quality, 
mobilize international finance for network expansion, and thereby improve and increase access to 
water supply for Jakarta residents – particularly the poor. As documented in this report, a survey 
of performance of the private sector concessionaires indicates that key original performance 
targets have been dramatically scaled back. Moreover, there is evidence that new connections have 
targeted middle-class customers, and that tariff increases have been higher for poorer customers, 
without concurrent attempts to address issues of ability to pay, income thresholds, and cross-
subsidy mechanisms. Tariff pricing (with lower tariff bands below marginal costs), decided by the 
municipal government in negotiation with concessionaires, is implicitly ‘anti-poor’, providing a 
disincentive to both the municipality and the private concessionaires to connect the poor.   
 Moreover, Section 3 documented how poor users have multiple disincentives to connect to the 
network. Total costs of networked water supply may be higher than alternative sources (such as 
groundwater or vended water). Other disincentives include insecure tenure, the need for flexibility 
of payment, convenience, status, and high ‘transaction costs’ associated with dealing with the formal 
water utilities. ‘Transaction costs’ (infrastructure costs to build storage because networked water 
supply is only intermittent; line-ups and time off work to pay bills (for those without bank accounts 
and regular income); fear of time required to deal with meter mis-reading and bill over-charging) 
are other disincentives. 
 
These findings echo results of other studies regarding urban water supply in the South (eg. Almansi 
et al 2003; WaterAid 2003; Whittington 1992). Much of this literature is, however, characterized 
by a narrow economic reductionism, in which the failure of water utilities to reach the poor is 
attributed largely or solely to an inability-to-pay, or to inappropriate pricing. In this literature, the 
concept of poverty is used as a ‘regulating fiction’ (Rahnema 1992), obscuring the non-economic 
factors  that act as important disincentives for poor households, which choose not to connect to 
the water supply system. In a manner analogous to the colonial state’s active construction of the 
peasant (Mitchell 2002), the concept of the poor functions as a ‘post-colonial device’ (Bell 2002) 
that has become a preoccupation and focus for action by Northern aid and development 
organizations. This report has suggested that other questions should receive greater attention in 
the pro-poor debate, namely: the nature of urban governance (which, in Jakarta’s case, has 
systematically prioritized monumental infrastructure and elite residential services at the expense 
of universal public services); the inequitable spatialisation of network access (a legacy of public 
sector management to serve largely elite interests); and the multiple disincentives for the poor to 
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  1Water source 
Groundwater
Groundwater with bottled water/
vendedwater/public hydrant
Network water
Network water with groundwater
Public hydrant/vended water with rainwater
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Total %  exceeds 100 because some households
















































Social institutions (e.g. religious facilities) and public hydrants
Public hospitals and very poor households
Low income households
Middle income households and small-scale businesses
Upper middle income households and government offices


























































































































































Upper middle income households
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